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Abstract
The Political Economy of Pork-Barrel Spending
J. Zachary Klingensmith
This dissertation consists of five papers which examine the impact pork-barrel
spending has on legislative decision-making. In chapter 1, I introduce the theory
behind pork-barrel spending, legislative coalitions and other similar topics. In
chapter 2, I determine if pork-barrel spending has any impact on state
employment levels. I use both a spatial and non-spatial modeling methodology
to answer the question. Chapter 3 examines the relationship between the
amount of pork-barrel spending appropriated by the Senator and the amount of
money the Senator is able to fundraise. Chapter 4 integrates the results from
chapter 3 to develop two-stage and three-stage models which estimate electoral
success. The fifth and final chapter concludes the dissertation by using the
results from the other chapters to determine whether or not pork-barrel
spending suffers from the Tragedy of the Commons.
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Chapter 1: The Institutions of Pork-Barrel Spending
Abstract
Pork-barrel spending is used extensively by incumbent candidates for a variety of
reasons, including for the purposes of re-election. This chapter provides an
introduction to pork-barrel spending in addition to the institutions of pork-barrel
spending. This chapter concludes with a primer of spatial econometrics.

1.1 Introduction
One of the key challenges a politician faces is re-election. Incumbents have a variety of tools
at their disposal including the use of earmarks. Earmarks, also sometimes referred to as “porkbarrel spending” or “pork bills”, are specific spending projects which are inserted into other,
larger bills. In fact, most of the time, the earmark legislation is completely unrelated to the
original bill. Pork-barrel projects have been a major source of political controversy over the past
two decades. According to America.gov, “pork-barrel spending is the appropriation of federal
money for localized projects secured solely or primarily to bring money into a representative's
district.” Even though the costs are spread out over the entire national tax base, the benefits
are very concentrated. As I will show over this dissertation, politicians are able to use porkbarrel spending to their advantage.
Robert C. Byrd, the late Senator from the state of West Virginia was known as the ‘King of
Pork.’ In fact, his projects were commonly referred to as ‘Byrd Droppings.’ During his tenure in
the U.S. Senate, Byrd was notorious for his ability to appropriate federal money for projects in
West Virginia. From 1991 until his death in 2010, he brought in over $4 billion worth of pork.
Byrd once quipped “when I was a member of the West Virginia House of Delegates [in the
1950’s], West Virginia had four miles of divided highway. Four miles. Today the state has about
37,000 miles of highway.” Another hallmark of Byrd’s term in Senate was his dominance in
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elections. Table 1 shows Byrd’s performance in general elections. Other than the election in
which he originally won his seat, Byrd never received less than 64% of the vote in the general
election. While Byrd’s ability to appropriate pork-barrel money and his ability to win elections
may be a coincidence, there is evidence that incumbents have the ability to use this type of
money in their favor.
Table 1: Robert C. Byrd General Election Performance
Year
1958
1964
1970
1976
1982
1988
1994
2000
2006

% of Votes
59%
68%
78%
100%
68%
65%
69%
78%
64%

Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) gives seven criteria which can be used to
determine if a specific spending bill can be classified as ‘pork-barrel’ spending. The seven
criteria are as follows: the bill was requested by only one chamber of Congress, the bill was not
specifically authorized, the project was not competitively awarded, the spending was not
requested by the president, the spending greatly exceeds the President’s budget (or the
previous year’s spending), the bill is not subject to Congressional hearings, or the project only
serves a local or special interest. For the CAGW to consider certain spending as a pork-barrel
project, the spending must fall into at least one of the given categories, but the CAGW finds
that most of the projects satisfy at least two of the criteria (Waste 2001-2012).
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The aim of this chapter is to examine the core methodology and past research pertaining to
special-interest legislation. The information from this chapter is used heavily in the next three
chapters of the dissertation. The first part of the paper summarizes the institutional reasoning
behind earmark legislation along with the need for coalition formation. The second part looks
at the need for coalitions when pork-barrel spending is available as well as some theoretical
underpinnings of coalition formation. The third and final part of this chapter provides a primer
of spatial econometrics which is used later in this dissertation.

1.2 The Institutions of Earmark Legislation
Even though earmarks are not a major component of total government spending, they are
typically some of the most scrutinized aspects of legislation as people perceive the earmark
projects as inefficient. From 1991-2006, the number of earmark projects increased from around
500 per year to around 14,000 per year. In 2006, more attention was placed on the increasing
size of the federal budget, so the number of projects fell significantly. Outside of a spike in
2008, the number of projects gradually fell until a moratorium was issued in 2012.
The recent decline can be attributed to both the added scrutiny faced by legislators for
wasteful spending along with the general deadlock that has plagued the United States Congress
over the past few years. One issue not discussed is the recent change in the definition of “porkbarrel” spending. As politicians attempt to reduce wasteful spending, they recategorize these
projects to avoid the negative stigma attached to “pork-barrel politics.” For example, the
Republican Party enacted a ban on pork-barrel projects (Raju 2010), but Republican legislators
have simply found other ways to direct funding to their district (Tiron 2012).
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Figure 1 shows the number of earmark projects over the past two decades while Figure 2
displays the total amount of money spent on earmark projects over the same period of time
(Waste 2008-2010).
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Figure 1: Pork-Barrel Projects, 1991-2014 (Citizens Against Government Waste)
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Figure 2: Pork-Barrel Spending, 1991-2014 (Citizens Against Government Waste)
One area of interest is determining the reason for the rapid growth in pork-barrel spending.
One explanation is that pork-barrel spending is subject to the common resource problem
because the cost of earmarks are borne by everyone yet the benefits are spatially
4

concentrated. For instance, a new regional highway may provide benefits to the area that it
services, typically only a handful of Congressional districts, yet the cost is equally-shared by
each taxpayer. Weingast explains this phenomenon as the Law of 1/n, since a district that
receives the earmark receives the full benefit, yet bears only 1/n of the cost, where n is the
number of districts. Because districts do not bear the full cost of earmark spending, the end
result is a surplus of pork-barrel projects.
The general public often criticizes pork-barrel projects as they are often inefficient meaning
that the total economic costs exceed the total economic benefits. The efficiency of earmark
spending has been repeatedly questioned, even by government officials. In fact, in 2011, the
United States General Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report stating that the government
could save over $100 billion over the next decade by cutting some of the most wasteful
programs and projects, many of them associated with earmarked spending (Paletta 2011). In
another case, the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation produced a report in
which he noted that many of the transportation projects that were funded through earmark
spending were classified as low-priority projects and had not gone through the normal project
review process. Further, many of these low-priority projects were being funded over other
projects which were viewed as higher-priority and higher-need (Scovel III 2007).
Before proceeding any further, it is important to point out the difference between spending
on public goods and earmark spending. A theoretical framework which examines this difference
finds that the socially optimal level of spending allocates all funding to public goods and no
funding to earmark projects. But, legislators prefer public goods which are smaller than socially
optimal and earmark projects which are larger than optimal (non-zero.) This is because earmark
5

projects are typically more visible than public good projects. For instance, a legislator would
gain little recognition for voting to approve the annual funding for the military. Conversely, that
same legislator gains more notoriety if they secure funding to build a brand new military base in
their district. As the size of the party increases, earmark spending decreases while public good
spending increases due to the fact that the party must internalize special-interest costs as the
number of party members grows larger. (Primo and Snyder 2010).
Even though pork-barrel spending has a negative stigma attached to it, politicians still
pursue these projects. One of the reasons pork-barrel spending is still prevalent is due to
legislative shirking. While legislative ideology is a legislator’s personal belief, legislative shirking
is when a legislator breaks a campaign promise for political gain (Bender and Lott 1996). For
example, a legislator may break a spending reduction promise in order to receive a large
amount of federal funding. While this may go against the politician’s personal beliefs, this
action was taken benefit the legislator’s constituents and possible the politician’s re-election
chances. In any case, the legislator must be sure that the bill is actually passed in order to avoid
the situation where the legislator breaks her campaign promise but brings no money into her
district. Constituents are willing to overlook a broken campaign promise if the legislator is able
to attract a large earmark project to the district. In order to fully appreciate the situation, a
more thorough examination of coalition theory is required.

1.3 Theory of Coalitions
Because earmark projects have a limited spatial impact it is very difficult to get a single
earmark project passed. Thus, politicians must form coalitions with other legislators. This leads
to legislators engaging in vote-trading, also referred to as logrolling. Under this scheme,
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legislators vote for other projects in order to gain support for their project. Since specialinterest projects are typically expensive, legislators attempt to form a minimum-winning
coalition in order to have their projects passed while minimizing the total cost of the other
legislators’ projects. Yet, coalitions are typically oversized. One reason is the negative stigma
associated with special-interest spending. While voters are generally happy with specialinterest projects in their district, supporting projects in other districts or states is undesirable.
For instance, voters in West Virginia are upset paying for a forestry research program in
Oregon. On the other hand, those same voters are happy if a similar program is instituted in
West Virginia. Therefore, legislators create oversized special-interest coalitions to engage in
“blame avoidance.” If both parties engage in special-interest politics, then neither can criticize
the other party. Essentially, if a legislator is able to boast the projects they secured, the
constituents may overlook the other, non-beneficial projects (Balla, Lawrence et al. 2002).
Two other explanations about the consistent surplus of earmark projects pertain to
procedural measures. The first is that due to the cyclical nature of politics as the majority party
knows that they will eventually become the minority. Thus, by cooperating with the minority
today, the hope is that when the party becomes the minority, the new majority will also
cooperate on special-interest projects. The second possibility is that the majority party will only
respect the minority party’s procedural rights when there are interparty coalitions, thus there is
an incentive for legislators to join cross-party coalitions (Binder 1997).
Over the past few years, a major talking point in many election campaigns has been a
reduction in wasteful government spending. One method to accomplish spending reductions is
a decrease in earmark spending; but, politicians that make this promise rarely keep it. Party
7

discipline is a main reason for the failure of these spending reduction plans. By definition, party
discipline is the reward or benefit associated with voting for or against the official party position
on some bill. The benefit to belonging to a party is the low-cost “branding” associated with the
party name. For instance, Republican typically conveys “pro-business” while Democrat conveys
“pro-worker” even if those labels are not accurate for the specific legislator. Parties are very
interested in maintaining their brand name just as franchises maintain standards for individual
stores to preserve the company reputation. Legislators voting against the party brand may be
subjected to penalties such as roadblocks in presenting bills, reduced funding for re-election,
and expulsion from the party. On the other hand, a party leader must be careful not to overextend the voting requirements on its party members. Constantly forcing legislators to vote
against their own constituents’ interests causes the branding to be less desirable (Snyder and
Groseclose 2000).
For instance, consider the West Virginia Democrats and environmental regulations. It is
expected that they will vote against most of the new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulations even though the Democrats typically vote for new environmental regulations. The
other party members assume that they will vote against the EPA regulations not because they
are siding with the Republican Party; rather, it is because they know the legislators must vote in
favor of their constituents’ interests periodically in order to remain in office. Legislators use this
to rationalize voting for special-interest bills which will help the legislator’s district yet goes
against the branding of the party.
Another finding is that parties tend to be centralized coalitions, meaning that the central
party has control over party members at the national, state, and local level. For instance, the
8

Republican party not only controls large amounts of funding for national elections such as the
presidential or Congressional races, but the party also controls re-election funding for state and
important local races. Therefore, the amount of distributive projects is lower when there is a
strong central party as politicians must adhere to party restrictions in order to secure future reelection funding.
The process of creating a coalition is also an important area of study. Some questions that
are have been addressed in the coalition formation literature deal with who gets into the
coalition, how large the coalition becomes, how long a coalition takes to form, and how long
the coalition lasts. One important factor is the optimal size of the coalition. If a coalition is too
large, then the benefits derived from coalition membership are over-dispersed amongst the
group members. On the other hand, if a coalition is too small, then even if it is a majority
coalition, it can be prone to possible defection by marginal members (Diermeier, Eraslan et al.
2002). Therefore, forming the minimum-winning coalition is one strategy which maximizes the
benefits of being in a coalition while minimizing the costs, which can be quantified as the
dispersion of benefits amongst members. As the slices of the pie get smaller and smaller, the
benefit of being in a coalition decreases. The traditional theory is that the minimum winning
coalition is “50% plus one” (Riker 1962; Koehler 1975; Brams and Fishburn 1996) but an
alternate viewpoint is that the two-thirds supermajority is more cost-effective as it minimizes
the importance and the cost of the marginal members of the coalition (Groseclose and Snyder
1996).
The second question pertaining to coalition formation deals with how long it actually takes
to form. Coalition formation does not simply occur at a large gathering where groups pick
9

members. Instead, coalition formation is the result of backdoor meetings and trial-and-error.
For example, a majority formation may be created, yet the members are unable to agree on
what to vote for rendering the coalition ineffective. A study found that on average, it takes 1.7
attempts to create a working coalition in a sample of European parliamentary governments
(Diermeier and Merlo 2003). The formation of coalitions is clearly not a clear-cut process.
The final question relating to coalition formation is how long it stays together. As
mentioned, just because a coalition is formed does not mean it is effective. The same paper
found that the average duration the European coalitions stayed together was 611 days. Some
factors which can impact the duration of the coalition are no-confidence votes and bicameral
legislatures. The lack of a no-confidence vote in a constitution decreases the average duration
of a coalition as the necessity of a strong coalition is diminished. Further, it was found that
bicameral legislatures actually have no impact on the duration of coalitions.

1.4 Spatial Econometrics Primer
One of the newest branches of econometrics is the inclusion of spatial considerations. In an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the impact of a dependent or independent variable in
region x is assumed to have no impact on the values of the dependent and independent
variables in district y. Using the spatial econometric framework, it is now possible to include the
spatially-correlated impacts.
The first difference between a spatial and non-spatial model is the inclusion of a weightmatrix. A row-normalized contiguity weight matrix considers two geographic areas to be
neighbors if there is some physical border between them. If two areas are neighbors, the binary
weight variable is 1, else it is 0. A more preferred method is the nearest-neighbors weight
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matrix in which the n nearest states or districts, as defined by the straight line, centroid
distance between districts, are considered to be neighbors while the others are not. This allows
for two regions which may not actually have a border, yet have influence on each other, be
counted as neighbors. This is especially useful when considering geographical areas like the
northeastern United States since many of the smaller states are not contiguous yet they have a
significant impact on each other. Some econometricians disagree with the use of the nearestneighbors weight matrix because of the perceived sensitivity to the number of nearest
neighbors; but, it has been shown that the number of nearest neighbors does not have any
significant impact on the outcome of the coefficients (LeSage and Pace 2010).
I will discuss four different spatial models below. First, the spatial error model (SEM) best
fits the case where the values of the independent variable from one district can impact the
dependent variables of other districts. Formally, the SEM model can be written:
𝑦 = 𝑥𝛽 + 𝜇
𝑢 = 𝜆𝑊𝑢 + 𝜀
In order to conceptualize the use of the SEM model, consider employee mobility. Because many
people do not live in the same district in which they work, not using a spatial model would
ignore the relationship between independent variables in one county and the dependent
variable of a neighboring county. For instance, an increase in the poverty level in the inner-city
would likely not cause any significant change to the employment in the district because most
city employment, as mentioned earlier, is higher-skilled white-collar work. But, if the poverty
levels increase in the surrounding, suburban districts, the impact on employment in the urban,
inner-city, district may be much more distinct.
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The second model that can be used is the Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR). In this model,
the value of the dependent variable in one district can have an impact on the dependent
variable of a neighboring district. The SAR model closely resembles an autoregressive model in
time-series econometrics with the major difference being the use of space (Beaudry, Green et
al. 2007) as opposed to time. Formally, the SAR model can be written
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝜀
𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 𝐼𝑛 )
In order to conceptualize the use of the SAR model, consider the fact that the level of
employment in one district has an impact on employment in surrounding districts (Beaudry,
Green et al. 2007). On one hand, an employment increase in one district could negatively
impact the level of employment in surrounding districts due to backwash effects. If the
employment base does not increase and the labor force simply shifts from one district to
another, then there would be a negative relationship. On the other hand, there could be spread
effects where economic growth in one district could spill over to neighboring districts and
promote employment growth throughout the region.
The third model that is considered is the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) which simply
incorporates both the spatial lag and spatial autoregressive aspects of the SEM and SAR models.
The SDM can be written as
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑊𝑋𝜃 + 𝜀, 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 𝐼𝑛 )
The conceptualization of the SDM can be thought of as a combination of the explanation of
both the SAR and SEM models.
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The fourth and final model considered is the spatial lag model (SLX). The spatial lag model is
considered to be a ‘local model.’ Unlike the SAR model which is considered a ‘global model,’ the
SLX only considers the spatial impact of the state or district’s nearest neighbor. The SLX model
can be written as
𝑦 = 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑊𝑥𝜃 + 𝜀
where x is the set of independent observations, 𝛽 is the set of non-spatial coefficients, W is the
weight matrix and ϴ is the set of spatial coefficients. The Wx variable is used to consider the
impact of neighbors’ independent variables on the state or district on interest.
In order to determine whether spatial modeling should be used, it is necessary to conduct a
Lagrange Multiplier testing procedure to test for the presence of both spatial error and spatial
autocorrelation (Anselin, Bera et al. 1996; Florax, Folmer et al. 2003). If both spatial error and
spatial autoregressivity are detected, then the spatial Durbin model is appropriate.
Recent improvements in technology have even allowed to the execution of spatial panel
models which can use fixed effects, random effects and time effects (Anselin, LeGallo et al.
2008; Elhorst 2010). This advance has allowed researchers to consider the impacts of policies
not only spatially, but also over time. One problem faced by spatial panel models was the
biased estimators yielded by spatial regressions. In fact, when the conducting a spatial panel
model with fixed and time-effects, the 𝛽, 𝛿, and 𝜎 2 values were all biased (Elhorst 2010; Lee
and Yu 2010). Therefore, a new set of estimators was derived which eliminated the problem of
parameter bias (Lee and Yu 2010). As long as the bias-correction routine is utilized, future
spatial panel regressions should no longer be prone to estimation problems.
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Unlike a non-spatial panel model, the coefficients of the SAR and SDM have no meaning so
using the standard interpretation of the coefficients leads to incorrect conclusions (LeSage and
Pace 2009). In order to properly analyze the results, the coefficients must be re-calculated to
find the direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is similar to the standard interpretation of
a beta coefficient; that is, as the x variable increases by 1, the dependent variable changes by
𝛽𝑖 . But, spatial influence is very important when using spatial econometrics, so the impact on
other geographic regions must also be calculated. Specifically, the indirect effect is the total
impact that a change in an independent variable or the spatial autoregressive term in region x
has on the dependent variables in other regions. Essentially, the indirect effects can be used to
calculate the spillovers from one region to another.
The impact of earmark spending is shown to have a strong spatial impact; thus, the use of
spatial econometrics throughout this dissertation is paramount to the study of earmark
spending on factors such as employment, wages and income distributions.

1.5 Conclusion
This dissertation examines several topics pertaining to the legislative uses of pork-barrel
spending, specifically focusing on how legislators may benefit from participating in pork-barrel
projects. The second chapter of this dissertation examines the impact pork-barrel spending has
on state-level employment. Because employment gains can be beneficial to an incumbent and
their chances at re-election, this chapter will determine if pork-barrel spending actually does
have any impact on employment. I find that pork-barrel spending does create jobs in the shortrun, but many of those jobs disappear after only one year. Further, job increases in one state
due to pork-barrel spending can lead to reductions in employment in surrounding states.
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The third chapter focuses on the role pork-barrel spending has on the incumbent’s ability to
fundraise. Specifically, I find that pork-barrel spending does have a positive and significant
relationship with fundraising indicating a reward system for major contributors. I also attempt
to determine if general federal appropriations have a similar impact on fundraising but find that
general federal appropriations have a negligible impact an incumbent’s ability to fundraise.
The fourth chapter takes the results from the third chapter and produces a model similar to
that of Stratmann (2013) in which two-stage and three-stage models are used which addresses
the endogenous relationship between pork-barrel spending, fundraising and electoral success.
The fifth and final chapter summarizes the results by determining whether or not porkbarrel spending suffers from a Tragedy of the Commons which would indicate a Fiscal
Commons Problem.
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Chapter 2: Pork-Barrel Spending and State Employment Levels
Do Targeted National Expenditures Increase State Employment in the Long Run?

Abstract
A targeted national expenditure, also known as pork-barrel spending, is defined as
federal project which is funded by the national tax base yet only benefits a small,
localized population. Anecdotally, this type of spending is often criticized as shortsighted, inefficient and wasteful. This paper incorporates pork-barrel spending into
existing research on the drivers of state economic growth to determine the role of
pork-barrel spending on both state employment and gross state product. First, I find
that many of the initial-year economic conditions that drive employment in MSAs also
drive employment at the state-level. Second, I find that pork-barrel spending also
influences employment levels, but the effect tends to be temporary. Specifically, for
every one million dollars of pork-barrel appropriated by a state, total employment in
the state increases by around 735 jobs in the year the funding is secured. However,
less than 100 of those jobs remain the following year. This gives credibility to the
argument that pork-barrel spending is used to support short-sighted political goals
such as re-election. Finally, using a spatial lag model, I find that the benefits of porkbarrel spending do not spill across state lines providing evidence that pork-barrel
spending only benefits a concentrated population.

2.1 Introduction
Pork-barrel projects have been a major source of political controversy over the past two
decades because they are funded with national tax revenues yet only benefit a small, localized
population. At the federal level, this occurs when a legislator is able to finance a project in their
district—a bridge, highway, or park—with tax revenue collected from the entire country.
Anecdotally, many pundits see pork-barrel projects as wasteful; but, pork-barrel projects are
not necessarily wasteful. Rather, many of these projects have a narrow geographical benefit
which generates criticism from those that do not receive any benefit. Generally, it is believed
that legislators pursue this funding in order to bolster the chances at re-election. 1

1

Stratmann (2013) summarizes the available literature. While there are several papers establishing a theoretical
foundation for using pork-barrel spending to enhance the likelihood of re-election but very few exist which find an
empirical link.
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There are several ways that pork-barrel spending may advantage incumbents. First, insofar
as local voters benefit from such projects, they will be more inclined to vote for the incumbents
who obtained them. Second, insofar as the projects benefit organized groups, such groups are
likely to contribute to the re-election campaigns of incumbents, which also improves the
likelihood of reelection. A third possible channel is through the economic effects of the
spending itself, which tend to increase employment. The construction and maintenance of
projects clearly require labor, capital, etc. Jobs are thus both directly and indirectly created.
Some persons are directly employed and subsequent purchases by all the input providers
create other new jobs 2. Those whose income has been increased by pork barrel projects are
also likely to support candidates at the voting booth and with their campaign contributions.
This paper examines the effects of pork barrel spending on job creation.
One major focus of research in labor economics is determining the factors that contribute
to increases in employment. This type of research has been conducted at both the national and
subnational levels. In general, the results suggest that both economic and public policies
matter. Political jurisdictions compete with each other for residents and tax base using a
combination of fiscal packages (tax and expenditure combinations). Among the more important
expenditures are those on education and infrastructure. Other relevant variables are beyond
the control of local and national governments such as natural resource endowments and
location. While some literature has considered the role of government policy on employment,

2

There is a substantial political science literature that suggests incumbents are helped by local pork barrel
spending. Even if they genuinely care about their constituents, they still need to focus on being re-elected in order
to remain in office so they can continue to cater to the needs of their constituents. (Bickers & Stein, 1996; Ferejohn
& Krehbiel, 1987; Inman, 1988; Keefer & Khemani, 2009; Shepsle, Dickson, & Van Houweling, 2002; Shepsle &
Weingast, 1981; Weingast, 1979; Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981).
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to this point it has neglected the extent to which targeted projects affect local employment
levels and economic growth rates.
This paper uses established labor models to determine whether or not pork barrel spending
has an impact on employment. The results suggest that pork barrel spending increases state
employment levels, but these effects do not seem to be permanent. For every one million
dollars spent, total employment in the state increases by around 735 jobs in the year the
funding is secured. However, 650 jobs are lost the following year. In general, the results suggest
that targeted expenditures, such as those associated with “shovel ready projects,” have a
temporary, but substantial effect on employment. This is plausible due to the prominence of
construction and construction-related jobs associated with pork-barrel projects. In addition to
the impact on employment, there are corresponding increases in the gross state product, but
this impact is also temporary.

2.2 Public Policies and State Employment
The top priority for most politicians is to be re-elected. If a legislator presides over a district
with high levels of unemployment, they may have a more difficult time being re-elected (Alt
1985). Therefore, the legislator has an incentive to do everything in their power to provide
opportunities for employment, especially when job growth is lacking. One of many ways that a
legislator may be able to increase employment is through the appropriation of earmarked
spending projects. The government can impact state employment through such policies as an
increase in government expenditures (Rephann and Isserman 1994), changes in the tax level
(Nickell 2003), and in minimum wage law (Zavodny 2000). In general, policies that promote a
more business friendly environment increase state economic growth (Gwartney and Lawson
1996; Karabegović, McMahon et al. 2002; Miller, Holmes et al. 2012; Stansel 2013).
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Other possible policies include employment subsidies, micro-credit organizations, and
public works projects. Policies that promote public capital investments also have a positive and
significant impact on employment growth (Munnell and Cook 1990). Tax credits to firms for the
creation of new, full-time jobs have also been shown to have a positive and significant impact
on employment levels. Nonetheless, the efficiency of such programs are still in question (Faulk
2002) because the taxes and borrowing necessary to fund the programs tends to reduce jobs,
as do changes in policy that increase regulatory uncertainty. Tax revenue has both direct and
indirect burdens that tend to reduce employment. Thus, spending an additional dollar on one
program may increase jobs in the targeted area, but reduce them in others.
In addition, government programs compete with each other for funds. Spending a dollar of
tax revenue “here” means there is one less dollar available to be spent on other projects and
programs “there.” With respect to earmarked spending, one additional dollar appropriated for
Florida means that there is one less dollar available for the rest of the forty-nine states (and the
rest of the world.) Also, politicians engaging in demand-side policies are typically more
interested in the visibility of the program and not so much with the efficiency or effectiveness
of the spending. In fact, the United Nations found that many international demand-side funding
programs are riddled with fraud and are typically ineffective and a ‘waste of money’ (Nations
2007).
This paper looks specifically at the effects of targeted national expenditures in the United
States, more commonly referred to as earmarks or pork-barrel spending. The goal of this paper
is to determine the impact of pork-barrel spending on employment.
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2.3 Model, Data, and Estimation Strategy
I use a labor market model based on Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill (2009) and Glaeser et al.
(1992) for purposes of estimation. These models were developed to examine factors that drive
employment in urban areas, and rely upon a broad range of demographic characteristics to
estimate MSA employment and GNP. Their results suggest that business environment, natural
amenities, and economic age are main drivers of urban economic performance, other things
being equal. They explore how initial values of such economic fundamentals affect the ten year
average growth rates in employment and per capita GMP in large cities. Ten years is considered
a sufficient time for long run responses to favorable or unfavorable initial conditions to affect
the overall metropolitan area’s economy. Blumenthal et al (2009) and Glaeser (1992) also use a
ten-year period to capture the long run effects of economic fundamentals and public policy on
metropolitan employment and economic growth.
The estimation strategy of this paper assumes that the Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill
methodology also applies to state economies, but that in addition to economic fundamentals,
external grants may also have temporary or permanent effects on employment and economic
development. Due to data availability, the present study focuses on the 2001 to 2008 period. In
addition to the seven-year ordinary least squares model similar to those of the urban studies,
the present analysis also tests for the presence of spatial dependencies. Insofar as employment
opportunities generated by earmarked projects may attract workers and firms from
neighboring states, this is an obvious concern for the present study.
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Data: Demographics
In order to apply the Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill (2009) approach, data on state
demographics, natural amenities, and business climate were collected for the fifty states in the
year 2001, which was used as the base year. In addition, data on state employment, GSP, and
earmarked spending were collected for the 2001-2008 period. Data on pork-barrel spending are
taken from the Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) data set. The CAGW dataset is one
of the most commonly used collection of pork-barrel spending having been used in a variety of
papers such as Stratmann (2013) and Boyle and Matheson (2009). In addition, it is one of the
few datasets which dates back to 1995.
As mentioned earlier, pork-barrel spending is federal money which is used to fund projects
with a geographically concentrated benefit. Therefore some view this form of appropriation to
the wasteful, especially because many of the projects funded by pork-barrel spending are
categorized as “low-need” and likely would not have been funded without pork-barrel spending
(Scovel III 2007).
The pork-barrel spending variable takes two different forms. The first variable used is the
total amount of state earmarked spending appropriated from 2001 to 2008. The second uses a
set of annual spending variables from 2007-2008. I focus on the spending in the last two years
of the period of interest, because these expenditures appear to have the largest effects. These
annual expenditures allow tests of the short and long term effects of spending to be separated
from one another.
The state demographic variables measure the characteristics of state residents in 2001.
These include the level of human capital, race and age. These factors have been shown to
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impact urban labor supplies and employment levels. See, for example, Levy, Darst, Wolman and
Young (2008) and Wolman, Levy, Young and Blumenthal (2008).
Human capital affects marginal product and the quality of job opportunities in the present
and in the future (Card 1999). Two measures of state human capital were collected, the
percentage of adults in a state with a high school diploma in 2001 and the percentage of adults
with a bachelor’s degree in 2001. Both are taken from the US Census. In general, having a high
school diploma measures the population’s access to basic education while having a college
diploma indicates that an individual possesses a more specialized skill.
The age distribution of a state can also has direct effects on the potential supply of labor.
For example, if a large percentage of the populace belongs to the ‘dependent population’; that
is, children under the age of 18 and adults over the age of 65, the potential labor supply tends
to be smaller. Both child labor laws and eligibility requirements for retirement programs
exclude most of those populations from the labor force. Although beyond the scope of this
paper, a large fraction of persons of “dependent” age tends to increase the demand for
education and/or healthcare services without producing the tax revenues necessary to support
those services. This reduces state funds available for employment promoting expenditures. The
percentage of the state’s population that was under 18 in 2001 and the percentage of the
state’s population that was aged 65 or older in 2001 is included in the demographic variables
each taken from the US Census. Finally, the logarithm of the 2001 population of the state is
used to account for a state’s employment potential.
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Data: Capital Stock and Business Climate
In addition to the initial composition of the labor force, the Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill
(2009) results suggest that the preexisting capital stock and location affect prospects for
economic development. Two components of the economic structure of a state are used:
industry composition and labor costs. The location quotient is one way to measure the
industrial composition of an area. The location quotient (LQ) is formally defined as
𝐿𝑄 =

𝑒𝑖 /𝑒
𝐸𝑖 /𝐸

Where 𝑒𝑖 is the state-level employment in industry i, 𝑒 is the total state employment, 𝐸𝑖 is the
national employment in industry I and 𝐸 is the total employment in the United States. The LQ
allows for a straightforward comparison of the proportion of the state workforce in a certain
industry against the proportion of the national workforce in the same industry. For instance,
6.08% of the West Virginia workforce is in the natural resources and mining sector which seems
to be relative unimportant; but, its relative significance becomes apparent as only 1.80% of the
US workforce is employed in the natural resources and mining sector.
The 2001 location quotients for the manufacturing industry and the finance, insurance, and
real estate (FIRE) industry as classified by the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) are used to characterize the preexisting capital stock and networks. These data are
taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Past studies have established that an area with a high manufacturing LQ experience higherthan-average job losses due to the decay of the American manufacturing industry (Glaeser,
Kallal et al. 1992; Glaeser, Scheinkman et al. 1995; Blumenthal, Wolman et al. 2009). On the
other hand, the FIRE sector has experienced growth over the past several decades so there
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should be a positive relationship between the FIRE LQ and change in employment. States that
started with higher shares of FIRE employment should have experienced higher than average
employment growth, all else equal.
The average cost of labor in a state is measured with the average annual wage rate. Higher
wage rates in one state can cause it to be less competitive versus other similar states. It has
been shown that regions with higher relative wage rates will shed employment over time
(Henderson, Kuncoro et al. 1995). The 2001 average yearly wage rate per job is used and is also
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for State-Level Regression
Variable
Change in Total Employment (thous. of jobs)

Mean
84.81

St. Dev.
193.14

Min
-507.9

Max
1,006.9

BLS

87.96

113.11

6.09

630.00

Aggregate Pork Spending (bil$)

CAGW

1.30

0.878

0.124

4.13

2008 Pork Spending (mil$)

CAGW

202.79

133.61

14.3

666.4

2007 Pork Spending (mil$)

CAGW

31.51

55.73

0

319.7

LQ Manufacturing

BEA

.984

.360

.25

1.65

LQ FIRE

BEA

.965

.194

.71

1.59

Log(Population)

Census

6.54

.444

5.69

7.54

% of Population under Age 18

Census

24.3

1.74

21.3

31.1

% of Population over Age 65

Census

12.6

1.71

6.6

16.8

% of Population who are Black

Census

9.90

9.58

0.3

36.3

% of Adults with High School Diploma

Census

86.9

3.41

79.9

91.8

% of Adults with Bachelor’s Degree

Census

27.2

4.73

17.3

38.2

BLS

33.1

5.26

25.1

46.0

NRTW

0.48

0.50

0

1

Average July Temperature*
NOAA
0.54
Note: Variables marked with an asterisk are binary variables.

0.49

0

1

Change in Gross State Product (mil$)

Average Wage (thousands of $)
Right-to-Work State*

Source
BLS

Next, a state’s business climate is considered. As in Blumenthal et. al (2009), this paper uses
a binary variable indicating whether or not the state is a ‘right-to-work’ state. States which have
enacted ‘right-to-work’ legislation make it illegal for a firm to require an employee to belong a
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union. Twenty-two states which have right-to-work legislation and are perceived to be more
business-friendly (Holmes 1998).
Finally, a binary variable is used to measure the average July temperature. Specifically, the
variable has a value of one if the average July temperature for the state’s largest city exceeds
the average temperature in the contiguous United States of 74.3 degree Fahrenheit. This
variable controls for the impact of warmer weather on labor force migration.
The descriptive statistics and the sources for the data set are shown in table 2.

Estimation Strategy
Ultimately, while the factors discussed above are important, most studies neglect the
impact of directed national expenditures. For example, none of the papers reviewed by Levy,
Darst, Wolman and Young (2008) and Wolman, Levy, Young and Blumenthal (2008)
acknowledge the role of directed national expenditures in urban employment. In all likelihood,
directed spending does not have the same type of an impact as education or infrastructure
does at the national level considering the relatively small portion of the federal budget that
pork-barrel spending accounts for; but, it may nonetheless affect local employment
opportunities. The general structure of the employment regression is as follows:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗 ∙ 𝑋 + 𝜀
Where pork is both the current and lagged pork-barrel spending variables, X is the set of
independent variables, 𝛽 is a set of fixed, but unknown coefficients, and 𝜀 is the error term. I
also determine if gross state product is impacted by pork-barrel spending using the same
empirical framework.
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To determine whether such effects exist, three series of estimates are undertaken. First, the
suitability of the Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill (2009) approach for state employment during
the given time period is tested. Next, these models are augmented by including earmarked
spending variables. Finally, these OLS estimates are augmented by spatial econometric
estimates to account for interstate effects of targeted state expenditures. In general, the results
suggest that Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill approach can be used to model and estimate state
employment levels.
It should be noted that some variables included in Blumenthal et. al were not included in
the state-level analysis. Some of them, such as the number of airport departures and age of the
city were not included because they were not compatible at the state-level. In addition, a
seven-year time period is used instead of a ten-year period for two reasons. First, data
availability prevents including time periods before 2001. Second, the crash of the housing
market had a serious impact on the market from 2008 and beyond. By focusing on 2001-2008, I
avoid any variations in the market caused by the financial crisis.3

2.4 Estimation and Analysis
The two dependent variables focused on in this paper are the change in state total
employment and the change in gross state product between 2001 and 2008. The
unemployment rate is not used because changes in the unemployment rate can be misleading.
For example, a decrease in the unemployment rate could be a result of an increase in
employment; or it could be the result of a decrease in the size of the labor force because of
emigration or retirement. Employment is likely to better represent the goal of the legislators.

3

I consider different time periods in the appendix.
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Three hypotheses are tested: first that urban employment models can be applied to states,
second that earmarked federal expenditures affect state employment, and third that these
effects are not exclusively realized by the states receiving the targeted expenditures.
The first regression use an ordinary least squares (OLS) approach as in Blumenthal, Wolman
and Hill (2009). Replicating the original work ensures that the model performs in the same
manner as the original model. The second estimate includes the aggregate pork-barrel spending
each state accrued from 2001-2008. The third replaces the aggregated pork-barrel spending
variable with the disaggregated pork-barrel spending for 2007 and 2008. Regressions 4-6
replicate the first three regressions using the 7-year change in gross state product as the
dependent variable in lieu of the change in total employment.

OLS Estimates of State Employment Effects
Table 3 displays the results for the OLS estimates the Blumenthal et. al model with and
without the effects of earmarked expenditures. The first column replicates the pure Blumenthal
et. al. model on state data. In general the results match those of Blumenthal et. al (2009) paper.
The location quotient for the FIRE sector, the bachelor’s degree variable and the right-to-work
state dummy variable are all significant and positively correlated with changes in total
employment as expected. The only unexpected result is the sign of the high-school variable
which indicates that having a higher percentage of adults with a high school degree leads to job
loss. One possible explanation for this result is that having a more educated workforce could
lead to higher wages which eventually leads to job losses, but this same effect is not seen in the
college variable. In addition, it is likely that there is some relationship between the high school
and college education variables. It should also be noted that the size of the coefficients are very
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different; but, this reflects differences in the size of the economic units studied. The original
paper was conducted at the metropolitan level, whereas this study focuses on changes in
employment at the state-level.
Regression 2 includes the aggregate pork-barrel spending variable. For every $1 million
dollars of pork-barrel spending appropriated from 2001-2008, a net of 34 jobs are created. This
amounts to approximately $29,500 per job created. The other independent variables continue
to behave just as they did in the previous regression. What cannot be determined from
regression 2 is whether or not there are temporary jobs created that subsequently disappear
over the seven-year period. To account for this, annual expenditures during the last two years
of the time period of interest are included. The results from regression 3 show that $1 million of
pork-barrel spending in 2008 increases employment by 735 jobs. However, similar spending
from the prior year is causing jobs to disappear. This can be interpreted as a temporary effect
of targeted expenditures.
The first series of estimates suggest that many of the jobs created by pork-barrel spending
over the seven years are relatively modest in size. However, there appear to be short term
gains, after which jobs begin to disappear, possibly as the direct employment in public capital
projects disappears together with indirect employment generated serving those directly
employed.4

4

It bears noting that the employment numbers do not differentiate among part time and full time jobs, nor
between temporary and permanent jobs.
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Table 3: Non-spatial Change in Total Employment Regressions (Models 1-3)
Variable

Model 1
No Pork

Aggregate Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
2008 Pork Spending

Model 2
Agg. Pork
0.034
(0.034)

2007 Pork Spending
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
July Temperature
Constant

-197.07***
(65.81)
420.38**
(174.62)
272.93***
(82.75)
-50.83*
(27.70)
-72.00**
(29.05)
-9.76***
(3.16)
-33.87***
(9.92)
18.29**
(8.38)
-31.33***
(9.91)
94.58*
(57.06)
72.63
(55.05)
3,721.57
(1,366.36)
50
0.573
4.64***

-164.54**
(73.15)
445.41**
(176.27)
237.43**
(89.79)
-51.25*
(27.69)
-69.76**
(29.12)
-10.09***
(3.18)
-33.19***
(9.94)
20.43**
(8.64)
-31.44***
(9.91)
117.06*
(61.74)
73.66
(55.04)
3,713.78
(1,365.78)
50
0.585
4.35***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 1-3 – Change in Total Employment Level (thousands), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Model 3
Disagg. Pork

0.735**
(0.280)
-0.650
(0.544)
-168.27**
(71.17)
426.18**
(170.04)
135.26
(94.23)
-56.40**
(26.20)
-69.06**
(27.36)
-10.54***
(3.04)
-23.07**
(10.65)
18.58**
(8.06)
-28.01***
(9.54)
110.44**
(57.30)
124.54**
(56.38)
3,470.68**
(1,302.21)
50
0.643
4.99***

The short term effects, however, are surprisingly large. An additional $1 million worth of
directed expenditures leads to approximately 735 jobs. This amounts to less than $1,400 per
job created which seems to support the use of pork-barrel spending, even if the jobs are
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temporary. In theory, politicians are able to bring in pork-barrel spending to their state each
year in order to offset the job losses associated with older pork-barrel spending.
What is neglected is the fact that pork-barrel spending typically does not cover all of the
costs of the project. In some cases, there is a significant amount of spending that must be
matched by the state and local governments. In fact, some projects require matching
contributions from other agencies in the federal government or private companies. Essentially,
pork-barrel spending can be used to close the funding gap for projects. So, even though $1
million leads to approximately 735 jobs, this result does not actually mean that $1 million
purchases 735 jobs. All of the results thus far indicate support for the hypothesis that porkbarrel jobs are temporary and can be used for political gain even if there is a significant increase
in the quantity of temporary jobs.

OLS Estimates of State Economic Growth Rate Effects
Next, I repeat the first three, this time using the change in the gross state product (GSP.)
The results are given in table 4. The first estimate, model 4, attempts to replicate the
Blumenthal et. al model. However, several of the independent variables in this regression, such
as the location quotient for FIRE industries and several of the demographic variables are no
longer significant. In general, the Blumenthal et. al. approach does not work as well for state
GSP growth than for employment growth. Regression 5 includes the aggregated pork-barrel
spending variable, in addition to the other previously used control variables. In this case, the
aggregated pork-barrel spending variable is both positive and significant which indicates that
pork-barrel spending can be used to increase the GSP in the long-run even though the increase
is relatively small. The independent variables which were significant in the previous treatment,
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such as the location quotient for the FIRE industries, the percentage of the population over 65
years old and the average wage, maintain their expected relationship and statistical
significance. Regression 6 removes the aggregated pork-barrel spending variable and replaces
them with the two prior years of pork-barrel spending.
Table 4: Non-spatial Change in Gross State Product Regressions (Models 4-6)
Variable

Model 4
No Pork

Aggregate Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
2008 Pork Spending

Model 5
Agg. Pork
.046***
(0.013)

2007 Pork Spending
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
July Temperature
Constant

-70.62**
(29.86)
106.27
(79.23)
214.83***
(37.55)
-7.73
(12.57)
-16.16
(13.18)
-3.39**
(1.43)
-13.81***
(4.50)
4.21
(3.80)
-5.02
(4.50)
19.59
(25.89)
-34.04
(24.98)
337.40
(619.98)
50
0.745
10.03***

-26.84
(29.36)
139.94*
(70.74)
167.06***
(36.03)
-8.29
(11.11)
-13.13
(11.69)
-3.83***
(1.28)
-12.90***
(3.99)
7.09**
(3.47)
-5.17
(3.98)
49.85***
(24.55)
-32.66
(22.09)
326.77
(548.13)
50
0.742
12.74***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 4-6 – Change in Gross State Product (millions of $), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Model 6
Disagg. Pork

0.482***
(0.109)
-0.241
(0.212)
-37.30
(27.71)
128.50*
(66.20)
126.23***
(36.68)
-12.32
(10.20)
-14.81
(10.65)
-4.15***
(1.18)
-7.78*
(4.15)
5.12
(3.14)
-3.44
(3.71)
38.28*
(22.31)
-3.31
(21.95)
247.46
(506.97)
50
0.842
14.79***
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In this case, the $1 million worth of pork-barrel spending appropriated in 2008 increases
gross state product by approximately $482,000. This is to be expected since government
spending is part of the gross state product. In fact, a $1 million increase in pork-barrel spending
should, at least in theory, increase the gross state product by at least $1 million. The fact that
this is not observed is likely because the money may not be dispersed all at once; instead, the
appropriation and distribution of the federal money can follow two different schedules. The
other independent variables which were previously significant remain robust against changes in
the pork-barrel spending variable.

Spatial Estimates of State Employment Effects
Because labor markets tend to be regional in nature, a state-by-state approach is likely to
yield biased estimates of the effects of targeted expenditures. Specifically, pork-barrel projects
in one state may create spillover effects which increase employment in neighboring states. This
is especially likely when projects are done close to a state border. To test for such effects, two
additional series of estimates were undertaken using a spatial framework inspired by the nonspatial Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill (2009) model, the change in the total employment level in
the state is estimated using the spatial lag model (SLX):
∆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 α + 𝑋𝑖 β + 𝑊𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 θ + 𝜀
Where X is the set of independent variables, pork is the current and lagged pork-barrel
spending, α, 𝛽 and 𝜃 are fixed, but unknown coefficients, 𝑊𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 is the spatially lagged porkbarrel spending term, W is the five-nearest neighbor weight matrix and 𝜀 is the error term.
Blumenthal, Wolman and Hill (2009) model neglected the role of urban, state, and regional
interdependence in their work. Table 5 shows the results for the employment estimate.
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Table 5: SLX Employment Results (Models 7-8)
Variable
Total Pork Spending
Total Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)

Model 7
Aggregated Pork
0.036
(0.035)
-0.016
(0.073)

2008 Pork Spending
2007 Pork Spending
2008 Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)
2007 Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
July Temperature
Constant

-165.32**
(74.19)
434.61**
(184.98)
235.81***
(91.25)
-51.49*
(28.08)
-69.55**
(29.51)
-9.88***
(3.35)
-32.71***
(10.29)
-32.71**
(10.29)
-30.84***
(10.39)
115.11*
(62.59)
78.32
(59.52)
3,711.85
(1,383.68)
50
0.586
3.91***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 7-8 – Change in Total Employment (in thousands), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Model 8
Disaggregated Pork

0.826***
(0.302)
-0.761
(0.637)
0.617
(0.676)
-1.73
(2.49)
-167.16**
(74.36)
431.66**
(173.17)
110.47
(99.79)
-51.42*
(27.21)
-64.92**
(28.17)
-12.34***
(3.67)
-21.64*
(10.94)
22.65**
(9.37)
-27.91***
(9.71)
120.77**
(59.31)
119.57**
(58.88)
3,316.96
(1,372.44)
50
0.652
4.24***

The results are similar to the non-spatial results. A $1 million increase in pork-barrel
spending increases employment in the state which acquired the pork-barrel funding by
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approximately 825 jobs. But, the spatially lagged variables are not significant indicating that
pork-barrel appropriations in neighboring states have a negligible impact on employment in the
state in question. This result may point to a lack of employment spillovers associated with porkbarrel spending. This is in line with the perception of pork-barrel spending having a
geographically concentrated benefit.
The other independent variables also continued to be robust against changes in the model.
Even though the spillovers are not detected by the model, they likely do occur on the borders.
For example, Montana’s five-nearest neighbors are Washington, Idaho, Wyoming, South
Dakota and North Dakota. These six states have a total area of approximately 548,000 square
miles (or 18% of the United States total area). It is highly unlikely that there is a significant
amount of interstate commuting between these six states. On the other hand, Rhode Island’s
five-nearest neighbors only account for 73,000 square miles. Employment spillovers are much
more likely in this region.
One surprising result is the immediacy of job growth. Initially, I suspected that there would
be a lag between the appropriation of the funding and the increase in employment, but the
results do not support this. Evidently, contracting for earmarked projects takes place before the
money is actually received by the state.5

5

Of course, lobbying and other rent-seeking activities occur well before the law is passed. For example, states
began to lobby for enticements well before the Patient Care and Affordable Care Act of 2010 was passed. In one
case, Senator Bernie Sanders obtained $10 billion (with a “b”) to be used for the construction of new community
health centers (Frates 2009) before the law was passed. The same holds true for the infrastructure projects
associated with the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA.) Even before the bill was passed or
funds allocated, states competed for the funds that would be earmarked for state-specific projects. Barack Obama
referred to this as funding “shovel-ready” jobs.
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Spatial Estimates of State Economic Growth Rate Effects
Table 6 displays the results for the spatial change in gross state product. Unlike the
employment estimates, there is some evidence of spatial spillover. Specifically, there is some
evidence of the backwash effect as an increase in neighboring states’ appropriation of porkbarrel spending may lead to a decrease in gross state product for the state of interest. Again,
the other independent variables remain robust to changes in the structure of the model.

Implications of Estimates
The above results provide support for the hypothesis that earmarked and other targeted
spending can be used to increase employment. The results also suggest that the job effects are
temporary. While this may seem like a downside of pork-barrel spending, it actually provides
advantages for incumbents. Because these jobs eventually disappear, the incumbent must
continue to secure money to bring in new jobs. This benefits the incumbent because it allows
them to continually attach their name to job-creating legislation. A legislator may have a
difficult time taking credit for maintaining the job level but will have a much easier time taking
credit for job created using pork-barrel spending.
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Table 6: SLX GSP Results (Models 9-10)
Variable
Total Pork Spending
Total Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)

Model 9
Aggregated Pork
0.053***
(0.128)
-0.071**
(0.027)

2008 Pork Spending
2007 Pork Spending
2008 Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)
2007 Pork Spending (Spatial Lag)
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
July Temperature
Constant

-30.24
(27.29)
93.30
(68.05)
160.04***
(33.57)
-9.32
(10.33)
-12.23
(10.86)
-2.92**
(1.23)
-10.83***
(3.79)
3.69
(3.47)
-2.57
(3.82)
41.40*
(23.02)
-12.53
(21.90)
318.90
(509.02)
50
0.837
14.16***

Model 10
Disaggregated Pork

0.416***
(0.112)
-0.023
(0.237)
-0.417
(0.252)
0.186
(0.926)
-29.01
(27.67)
130.02*
(64.43)
145.09**
(37.13)
-16.05
(10.12)
-17.38
(10.48)
-3.22**
(1.37)
-8.42**
(4.07)
2.13
(3.49)
-3.22
(3.61)
32.38
(22.07)
6.11
(21.90)
436.62
(510.70)
50
0.859
13.85***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 9-10 – Change in Gross State Product (in billions of dollars), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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2.5 Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that earmarked and other targeted spending has local
economic effects on employment and economic development, albeit temporary ones. By using
an established model by Blumenthal, Wolman and Hall (2009), I was able to model factors
which influenced the seven-year change in total employment and seven-year change in gross
state product between 2001-2008. The main addition to the model was a pork-barrel spending
variable. When a seven-year aggregated pork-barrel spending variable is used, a $1 million
increase in pork-barrel spending creates less than 40 jobs. But, when lagged pork-barrel
spending is used, an additional $1 million dollars of pork-barrel spending increases employment
by nearly 750 jobs in the following year. But, after the following years, most of those jobs
disappear. This is likely due to the prominence of construction and construction-related jobs.
Jobs which did remain after the first four years tended to disappear within ten years of the
original funding. Similarly, the gross state product increases by around $482,000 in the year
following the $1 million acquisition of the earmark; yet, just as was the case with changes in
employment, the impacts on the gross state product were short-lived.
When a spatial lag model (SLX) is used, there is no evidence that pork-barrel spending
influences employment in surrounding states. The results mirror the non-spatial regressions
which indicate a quick increase employment followed by a reduction only a few years later. This
gives evidence to the belief that pork-barrel spending generates only spatially concentrated
benefits. Specifically, pork-barrel spending is only used to benefits in the Senator’s state
without any regard to the costs borne by the other states (and the rest of the world.) In
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addition, the independent control variables are also robust against changes in the structure of
the model.
Ultimately, there is evidence that pork-barrel spending can be used for countercyclical
policies although not for promoting long term economic growth or unemployment. The fact
that such programs are adopted in good times and bad suggests that pork-barrel spending is
utilized by politicians for short-term gains in hopes of increasing their chances of being reelected, rather than to promote long term economic objectives.
While this paper focuses on employment and economic growth, it should be noted that
there are other benefits to the use of pork-barrel spending. For example, pork-barrel spending
that funds a new museum may marginally increase the employment level in an area after it is
built, but the main purpose of the museum is to provide an amenity for state residents.
Whether the employment effects or the amenity effects of targeted expenditures have the
greater effect on incumbent reelection prospects is left for future work.

2.6 Appendix: Alternative Time Periods
3-Year Changes in Employment
Anytime a specific timeframe is selected, questions arise regarding whether the effects
detected are due to the independent variables or if the relationship is merely a consequence of
some lurking variable. In the original paper, I considered the change in employment from 2001
to 2008. In this appendix, I will use a three-year rolling average from 2001 to 2008. The major
difference in this estimation is that the pork-barrel spending for a total of three years is used:
the pork-barrel spending from the year in question as well as the pork-barrel spending from the
previous two years. In addition, I also use the aggregate spending from the three years. While
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the results do not match exactly, they do give further evidence to the hypothesis that
employment is created through pork-barrel spending. Table 7 replicates regressions 1-3 with
the only difference being the four-year time period.
Table 7: Non-spatial Change in Total Employment Regressions (Models 11-13)
Variable

Model 11
No Pork

Aggregate Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
Pork Spending in Year t

Model 12
Agg. Pork
0.102***
(0.016)

Pork Spending in Year t-1
Pork Spending in Year t-2
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
July Temperature
Constant

-152.40***
(25.83)
145.12**
(58.94)
320.77***
(29.04)
4.24
(9.80)
-9.70
(9.85)
-7.62***
(1.25)
-22.30***
(3.64)
3.85
(3.30)
-0.000
(0.003)
81.09***
(22.87)
-43.17**
(21.96)
-42.49
(480.46)
250
0.625
36.08***

-85.55***
(26.08)
246.39***
(56.79)
265.43***
(28.23)
-7.72
(9.26)
-14.40
(9.14)
-8.19***
(1.16)
-20.87***
(3.38)
9.20***
(3.16)
-0.003
(0.003)
133.48***
(22.69)
-38.92*
(20.33)
229.01
(446.59)
250
0.680
42.04***

Model 13
Disagg. Pork

0.088
(0.079)
0.346***
(0.102)
-0.263***
(0.079)
-134.33***
(27.49)
180.59***
(57.41)
297.54***
(31.31)
3.18
(9.45)
-9.05
(9.44)
-7.68***
(1.21)
-22.39***
(3.50)
6.56**
(3.22)
-0.003
(0.003)
93.72***
(23.87)
-43.23**
(21.05)
42.93
(463.79)
250
0.660
32.61***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 11-13 – Three-Year Change in Total Employment Level (thousands), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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The main difference is this case is that the changes are not immediate. Furthermore, the
impacts are not as significant. In any case, the same general transitory effects are present. In
addition, the other control variables are not as robust. This is likely due to the shorter time
period. One of the hypotheses of the original work is that many of these factors impact
employment over the long-run; but using a three-year time period may not fully capture the
impact of the control variables.
When multiple time periods are used, additional econometric techniques become available.
Specifically, I utilize a fixed-effect panel regression with time-based binary variables. The
Hausman test indicated that a fixed-effect regression should be used. The results of the
Hausman tests are given below.
Table 8: Hausman Test Results I
Regression
Chi-Squared Statistic
No Pork-Barrel Spending
31.74***
Aggregated Pork-Barrel Spending
28.61***
Yearly Pork-Barrel Spending
35.23***
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

I replicate the original three regressions once again only within the fixed-effect panel regression
framework. Due to the inclusion of state fixed effects, the population, right to work and July
temperature variables are excluded. In addition, I include the yearly binary variables. The
results are given below in table 9.
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Table 9: Panel Change in Total Employment Regressions (Models 11-13)
Variable

Model 14
No Pork

Aggregate Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
Pork Spending in Year t

Model 15
Agg. Pork
-0.012
(0.058)

Pork Spending in Year t-1
Pork Spending in Year t-2
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Year 2005
Year 2006
Year 2007
Year 2008
Constant

1.22
(72.57)
247.99*
(131.32)
47.48**
(19.62)
19.51
(44.59)
-130.13***
(36.22)
21.47**
(10.44)
-16.42
(10.98)
0.012
(0.015)
5.07
(22.42)
90.77**
(40.34)
61.88
(57.41)
76.09
(78.11)
-2,092.87
(1,244.02)
250
0.423
11.48***

2.06
(72.88)
249.54*
(131.87)
47.41**
(19.68)
18.63
(44.92)
-129.27***
(36.56)
21.54**
(10.46)
-16.77
(11.14)
0.012
(0.016)
4.73
(22.54)
89.60**
(40.83)
58.58
(59.79)
72.26
(80.54)
-2,091.73
(1,247.21)
250
0.423
10.55***

Model 16
Disagg. Pork

0.137*
(0.077)
-0.271***
(0.079)
0.007
(0.089)
-5.32
(69.42)
293.65**
(125.80)
55.48***
(18.79)
25.35
(42.66)
-119.49***
(35.00)
18.08**
(9.97)
-16.24
(10.58)
0.011
(0.015)
-4.57
(21.59)
80.93**
(39.33)
71.45
(56.88)
26.23
(77.86)
-2,165.71
(1,184.86)
250
0.486
11.64***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 14-16 – Three-Year Change in Total Employment Level (thousands), 2001-2008
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Quantitatively, the results are not as robust. Some of this is likely due to the fixed-effects
picking-up some of the variance caused by the control variables. Also, as previously mentioned,
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this model was specified to examine long-run changes in employment and is not completely
suitable for only three-year changes.

The Special Case of the 2008 Recession and Stimulus
In addition to a three-year change in employment, I also include a nine-year change in
employment. As mentioned, I am unable to go any further back than 2001 due to availability of
data. Further, starting in 2011, a moratorium was issued on pork-barrel spending which creates
data problems from 2011 and on. Therefore, the longest possible time period is 2001-2010. A
very serious issue arises when studying this time period: the 2008 ‘Great Recession’ and
corresponding stimulus bill. When considering the change in employment from 2001 to 2010,
the extreme job losses from 2008-2010 are included and are not indicative of the employment
experiences over the entire time period. Further, the extreme stimulus spending (including the
$787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) is atypical. Therefore, the results from
this time period cannot be used to generalize the impacts of pork-barrel spending on
employment.
I repeat the original three regressions using the nine-year change in employment. The
results are reported in Table 10.
The estimates in this model are similar to the previous results with some differences. First
of all, the magnitude of the job gains (and subsequent losses) are far greater. This is likely due
to the fact that employment fell so much during the financial crisis. Second of all, the transitory
job losses seem to be delayed with job losses delayed for three years. In any case, these results
still adhere to the general conclusion that pork-barrel spending does indeed create jobs but
these jobs do not seem to be permanent. Therefore, legislators do have an incentive to pursue
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pork-barrel spending in order to increase employment in the short-run, but the corresponding
employment increases will not persist. Thus, if the legislator intends to continue to stimulate
employment, they must provide their state with a continual flow of pork-barrel money.
Table 10: Change in Total Employment Regressions (Models 17-19)
Variable

Model 17
No Pork

Aggregate Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
2010 Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
2009 Pork Spending

Model 18
Agg. Pork
0.09**
(2.35)

2008 Pork Spending
2007 Pork Spending
LQ Manufacturing
LQ FIRE
Log(Population)
Percent under 18
Percent over 65
Percent Black
Percent High School
Percent Bachelor’s
Average Wage
(thousands of $)
Right to Work
Constant

-299.6***
(2.61)
678.9**
(2.61)
560.6***
(4.53)
-80.8**
(-2.08)
-121.0***
(-2.91)
-14.1***
(-3.18)
-61.5***
(-4.15)
31.2**
(2.49)
-49.5***
(-3.34)
163.3*
(1.92)
5,814***
(2.90)
50
0.65
7.39***

-190.2*
(-1.84)
774.0***
(3.11)
434.5***
(3.37)
-84.8**
(-2.30)
-117.9***
(-2.99)
-14.9***
(-3.54)
-58.1***
(-4.13)
37.1***
(3.06)
-50.0***
(-3.57)
236.3***
(2.75)
5,884***
(3.10)
50
0.70
8.00***

Model 19
Disagg. Pork

1.46***
(3.41)
0.71
(0.78)
-0.15
(-0.33)
-0.80**
(-2.54)
-247.3**
(-2.54)
734.7***
(3.16)
406.9***
(3.01)
-92.2***
(-2.72)
-112.0***
(-3.10)
-13.6***
(-3.25)
-43.4***
(2.93)
24.2***
(2.06)
-42.8***
(-3.31)
200.1**
(2.58)
5,119***
(2.92)
50
0.778
8.64***

Number of Observations
R-squared
F-Statistic
Dependent Variables
Models 17-19 – Change in Total Employment Level (thousands), 2001-2010
T-statistics in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Pork-Barrel Spending on Incumbent
Fundraising
Abstract
Pork-barrel spending is the use of federal money for localized projects which typically
yield only a narrow geographic benefit. It is a commonly held belief that politicians
utilize this spending to improve their chances of re-election. One way an incumbent
can increase their chances of re-election is through increased fundraising. This paper
investigates whether incumbents are able to use pork-barrel spending to bolster their
campaign contributions. I find that for every $1 million of pork-barrel spending,
incumbents are able to increase their campaign contributions by approximately
$17,000. But, this effect is only present when the incumbent properly times the
project. I also find that general federal appropriations do not have the same impact.
These results support the belief that legislators knowingly use pork-barrel spending
for their own personal benefit.

3.1 Introduction
Incumbents can use a variety of strategies in their quest for reelection. He or she can press
for legislation that advances the general interest of voters in the district. They can also attempt
to increase the funds available for campaigning for reelection. Information is costly for voters,
so much of their efforts will be to subsidize information about themselves and their rivals to
voters. News accounts suggest that candidates spend a good deal of time attempting to raise
money for their next campaign. One class of policies has the potential to both benefit voters in
a given district and simultaneously provide voters with information about the incumbent’s
ability to provide benefits to them, namely targeted spending in their electoral districts.
Incumbents can take credit for steering federal money into their home districts, and the
economic benefits generated and campaign contributions from those positively impacted by
the federal money both tend to improve their prospects for reelection. Bringing home “the
bacon” is also a strategy that their rivals cannot take advantage of.
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Pork-barrel projects thus can benefit the incumbent through three channels. First, porkbarrel spending can give a legislator’s constituents a reason to re-elect the legislator as porkbarrel projects are typically visible and useful to the constituents. Second, as shown in the
previous chapter of this dissertation, pork-barrel spending can result in improved economic
conditions. If a constituent’s life is indirectly improved through a pork-barrel project, that
citizen is more likely to cast a vote for the incumbent. Third, pork-barrel projects that benefit
specific concentrated groups will encourage campaign contributions from said groups. All three
of these effects increase the likelihood that an incumbent is re-elected.
This paper focuses on the third channel. The main goal of this chapter is to estimate the
effect that pork-barrel spending has on fundraising. Three hypotheses are tested: first that
pork-barrel spending has an impact on an incumbent’s ability to fundraise, second that the
timing of the pork-barrel appropriations matter, and third that general federal appropriations
do not have the same impact on fundraising that pork-barrel spending does.

3.2 District Targeted Federal Spending and Reelection
It is clear that if pork barrel spending can increase campaign contributions, that by itself
may be a sufficient reason to seek it. A long series of studies have shown that campaign
expenditures are directly related to success in an election (Palda 1973; Welch 1974; Palda 1975;
Dawson and Zinser 1976; Welch 1976; Samuels 2002; Stratmann 2013). Therefore, incumbents
have an incentive to do whatever is in their power to secure additional campaign contributions.
The question addressed below is whether pork barrel spending tends to increase campaign
contributions.
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There are several reasons why this might be the case. Firms that profit from pork barrel
spending may contribute to campaigns or encourage their employees to contribute as a
method of thanking the candidate or, but increasing their chance of reelection, increasing the
probability that additional profits from pork will come their way. Until recent Supreme Court
decisions, corporations could only indirectly directly contribute to candidates running for
federal office, but they could provide financial and other support to political action committees
(PACs).6
The link between campaign contributions and corporate gains is largely anecdotal in the
United States (Stratmann 1995; Milyo 1999); however, empirical evidence of this effect has
been shown in other countries such as Brazil (Boas, Hidalgo et al. 2014). For example, in 1993,
individual members of the Brazilian congressional Joint Budget Committee accepted kickbacks
of up to 3% of a project’s value in compensation for their assistance in funding approval
(Krieger, Rodrigues et al. 1994; Boas, Hidalgo et al. 2014).7 Even more recently, Andrade
Gutierrez, one of the largest construction companies in Brazil, increased its contributions in
municipal elections from nearly $75,000 to $37.1 million. During the same time, the company
was awarded nearly $3 billion in construction contracts associated with the 2014 World Cup
(Payne 2014).
Pinpointing the relationship between corp orate gains and fundraising in the United States
has been problematic for many reasons. First, due to campaign finance laws, corporations can
6

Of course, this link is likely to exist only in cases in which incumbents are likely to win. There is
little incentive to reward a candidate that has delivered in the past if they are not expected to
be able to do so in the future (Wilhite and Theilmann 1987). However, all incumbents except
those plagued by scandals have a high probability of reelection.
7
Once corporate campaign contributions were legalized in Brazil, the kickbacks were simply
paid through campaign contributions instead of previously under-the-table payments.
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only donate money to PACs which then use the money to support a politician or issue. Records
of PAC contributions are less detailed than those to candidates and therefore it is difficult to
measure corporate efforts to support incumbents. Moreover, the links between corporate
gains and public policy is rarely obvious. 8
Although it tends to be difficult to link corporate profits to national programs, this problem
is reduced for the case of targeted expenditures. Pork may be presumed to have the greatest
effect on the profits of firms in the district receiving the expenditures. Potential donors benefit
both from contracts to produce the services provided, necessary infrastructure for those
projects, and indirectly through expenditures by firms and their employees in the district of
interest. Chapter 2, for example, demonstrates that pork barrel spending tends to reduce
district unemployment.
Of course, legislators may also attempt to use general appropriations to their advantage.
General programs are typically much larger than targeted expenditures. However, legislators
have a more difficult time claiming credit for general government spending. This is both
because a single representative’s vote is rarely decisive and because many general federal
appropriations are formula-based so individual legislators have very little control over the
amount of money that each state receives (Lee 2003). As a consequence, large federal
programs are very difficult to change in a manner that generates state or district specific
benefits.

8

The productivity of campaign contributions may also be difficult to assess. For example, the
presence of many small contributors dilutes the significance of other larger donations
(Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003).
47

3.3 The Fundraising Effects of Pork Are Understudied
Given the extensive research conducted on political fundraising and the effects of campaign
spending, there has been surprisingly little research on the effects of pork-barrel spending on
campaign contributions. David Samuels (2002) finds that increased pork-barrel spending leads
to an increase in incumbent fundraising, all else equal. The additional campaign contributions
are then used to increase the likelihood of reelection. However, his work does not address the
mechanism through which pork barrel spending increases prospects for electoral success. This
paper investigates whether pork barrel spending tends to increase incumbent campaign
contributions
While Samuels (2002) posits that pork-barrel spending increases fundraising, Stratmann
(2013) contends that fundraising tends to increase pork. The results of this paper suggest that
Stratmann has misidentified the relationship and that Samuels analysis is more descriptive. My
study differs from Stratmann’s work in that it focuses on the Senate rather than the House of
Representatives. Senators normally have more direct effect over public policies, including pork,
than members of the House. Their longer terms also suggest that they will benefit from pork
that has beneficial effects only with a significant lag. Moreover, it is likely that expenditures
targeted at specific states generate benefits that are concentrated in states, rather than spread
out across districts through effects of sub-contracting, commuting, and shopping across district
boundaries.
There is, however, also one significant disadvantage associated with a state-level analysis
instead of a district-level study. There are two Senators per state elected at-large. Therefore, it
is impossible to separate the effect that each Senator has on targeted spending in their states.
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This implies that the Samuels and Stratmann’s framework can be applied at the state-level only
after several modifications are adopted.9

Model, Data and Estimation Strategy
I use a fundraising model based on Samuels (2002), Krebs (2001) and Bonneau (2007) for
the purposes of estimation. The Samuels (2002) model estimates the percentage of campaign
finance in a Brazilian state based on factors such as previous electoral success, number of terms
served and party leadership. In addition, Krebs (2001) analyzes fundraising in city council
elections and Bonneau (2007) addresses the determinants of fundraising in state Supreme
Court elections. While the last two papers are not performed at the federal level, many of the
determinants still apply regardless of the level of government being discussed.
This study extends the Samuels (2002) paper and complements Stratmann (2013) approach
in the following ways. First, the present study focuses on United States election cycles from
2004 to 2012, rather than a single election. Second, unlike the Samuels (2002) paper, this paper
examines the United States. Finally, this study focuses on the Senate unlike the Krebs (2001),
Bonneau (2007) and Stratmann (2013) papers which examine other levels of government.

Data
Data on the incumbent was collected for all Senators vying for re-election from 2004-2012.
Data on pork-barrel spending are taken from the Citizens Against Government Waste data set.
The pork-barrel spending variable takes two different forms. The first variable measures the
total amount of pork-barrel spending appropriated in the Senator’s state during their six-year

9

Another possible disadvantage is that spatial estimation techniques are unlikely to reveal coalition or logrolling
effects because incentives to do so are weaker. Fewer benefits are likely to be realized by adjacent states than
adjacent Congressional districts, because of differences in size and distance.
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term in millions of dollars. The second uses a set of annual pork-barrel spending variables
instead of the original aggregated form. The pork-barrel spending appropriated to a state is
linked to state electoral cycles, rather than years, per se. For instance, if a Senator was up for
re-election in 2008, I compute the amount of pork-barrel spending that went to the state from
2003-2008, both annually and in aggregate. This permits me to determine if when the porkbarrel money was appropriated with electoral cycles in has a subsequent impact on campaign
donations. Specifically, I test to determine if pork-barrel spending appropriated in the years
before a Senator stands for reelection impacts fundraising. Because Senate terms are six years
long, data from 1999-2012 is used. Since it is impossible to distinguish between the individual
efforts of each Senator, the total amount of pork-barrel spending appropriated by the state is
used. There are eight years of pork barrel spending data available at the state-level, but only
three years of data at the district level.
I hypothesize that an election cycle will be present in pork-barrel spending. Specifically,
pork-barrel spending will spike every two years in concert with the federal elections. Even
though a Senator is only elected every six years, other Senators will attempt to appropriate
pork-barrel spending for their own use. A graphical representation of the data shows the
existence of an election cycle with pork-barrel spending spiking during election years. This
graph is shown below.
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Figure 3: Average Pork-Barrel Spending by Years to Election

In order to assess differences between the impacts of pork-barrel spending and general
appropriations on fundraising, a federal aid variable from the US Census is also included as an
independent variable. This variable measures the amount of federal aid appropriated to each
state. The federal aid is calculated by federal outlays to states from a variety of federal
agencies10. The data are collected from the United States Census Statistical Abstracts of the
United States, specifically from the section titled “Federal Aid to State and Local
Governments—Selected Programs by State.” The Federal Aid variable does not include Social
Security or Medicare. In addition, I removed Medicaid spending. Two forms of this variable are
used. The first is the aggregate federal appropriations in billions of dollars during the Senator’s
six-year term. The second is the annual, disaggregated federal appropriation in the years prior
10

These agencies include the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Defense,
Department of Education, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Interior, Department of Justice,
Department of Labor, Department of Transportation and Department of the Treasury
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to an incumbent’s re-election year. Unfortunately, due to budget cuts, the US Census no longer
collects these data. As a result the regressions that use federal appropriation data are restricted
to 2004-2010.
By using the appropriations variable in addition to the pork-barrel spending variables, I am
able to determine whether or not general appropriation spending has the same impact on
fundraising as pork-barrel spending. If pork-barrel spending is shown to be more effective, then
the estimates provide an explanation for the attraction that pork-barrel spending seems to
have for Senators and other politicians.
Characteristics of individual senators were also collected. The number of terms variable
measures the seniority of the Senator in the Senate. As the number of terms increases, a
Senator normally gains additional power and influence, and should therefore be able to
increase the amount of federal money for their state. Because seniority rather than experience
is of interest, experience in other offices such as in the House of Representatives or state
legislature is not of interest. Insofar as experience may also affect a Senator’s effectiveness, I
include a binary variable indicating whether or not the Senator previously served in the House of
Representatives. Finally, previous success may have an impact on fundraising. Large donors only
benefit if their candidate wins. Therefore, a greater likelihood of winning may increase the
incumbent’s ability to fundraise. Thus, the percentage of the vote received in the previous
general election is included to measure past success.
The competitiveness of the challenger is also considered. As the likelihood of the incumbent
losing their bid for re-election increases, the need for fundraising also increases. To measure
the effect of challengers on fundraising, the amount of money raised by the challenger is
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collected from the Federal Election Commission and the Center for Responsive Politics’ ‘Open
Secrets.’ As the challenger increases their fundraising, the race becomes more competitive
increasing the need and level of incumbent fundraising.
The incumbent’s ability to fundraise for the general election may also depend on both the
primary election and the incumbent’s cash-on-hand. First, a binary variable is used if the
incumbent received less than 70% of the vote in the primary election 11. This is important as an
incumbent may have to spend a significant amount to simply make it to the general election.
Therefore, I anticipate a negative relationship between total fundraising and the percentage of
the vote received in the primary election because an incumbent who is relatively unchallenged
in the primary will not need to fundraise as much during the total election cycle. In addition, the
incumbent’s cash-on-hand is also included. This variable can be important as it may reduce the
incumbent’s need to raise funds for the current election cycle.
The population of a state can also influence total fundraising. States with a larger
population increase a legislator’s ability to fundraise. The log of state population, gathered from
the US census, is included.
There has also been some debate over whether or not females have greater difficulty in
raising funds due to the historical male-dominated environment of the United States political
system (Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986). Therefore a binary variable is included which has a value
of one if the incumbent is female.
Finally, I only use incumbents who served a full term. Therefore, Senators who were
appointed during the previous term or won a special election are not included as they do not

11

I used multiple values from 60% to 90% and got very similar results.

53

have the full six years to obtain funding. 12 From 2004-2012, 117 incumbent met this criteria and
were included. The descriptive statistics and the sources for the data set are shown in table 11.
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for State-Level Regression
Variable
Incumbent Fundraising (millions of $)

Source
FEC

Obs.
117

Mean
10.762

St. Dev.
7.481

Min
1.444

Max
51.567

Challenger Fundraising (millions of $)

FEC

117

4.060

5.847

0.001

28.162

Fundraising Advantage (in %)

FEC

117

81.354

17.416

36.222

99.992

Total Pork-Barrel Funding (millions of $)

CAGW

117

963.983

700.992

99.669

3640.200

Pork-Barrel Funding during election year

CAGW

117

166.427

151.641

0.000

733.634

Pork-Barrel Funding year prior

CAGW

117

125.093

135.391

0.000

588.800

Pork-Barrel Funding two years prior

CAGW

117

187.558

138.218

16.600

671.800

Total Federal Aid (billions of $)

Census

101

40.213

55.960

1.100

296.400

Federal Aid during election year

Census

101

9.585

12.036

1.200

66.600

Federal Aid year prior

Census

101

9.077

11.408

1.100

62.000

Federal Aid two years prior

Census

101

8.433

10.506

1.100

53.800

Congress

117

2.521

1.705

1.000

8.000

Census

117

0.571

0.461

-0.292

1.580

FEC

117

0.436

0.498

0.000

1.000

Congress

117

0.197

0.399

0.000

1.000

OpenSecrets

117

1.726

2.918

0.000

17.800

FEC

117

60.876

9.316

47.880

99.000

Congress

117

0.564

0.498

0.000

1.000

Number of Terms in Current Office
Log(Population)
Incumbent faced challenger in primary?
Female*
Cash-on-Hand (millions of dollars)
Percentage of vote in previous general election
House of Representatives*

* Variables marked with an asterisk are binary variables.

Estimation Strategy
The models estimated below have the form:
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽𝑗 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝛽𝑘 ∙ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀
where pork is the amount of state-specific spending, control is the array of control variables
described above, election year is a binary election year variable and ε is the error term.

12

Several minor data anomalies appeared during the estimation. For example, some candidates
do not face a viable challenger. In some races, the incumbent does legally have a challenger,
but the incumbent raises most of the money and receives most of the vote. I consider this
situation in the appendix.
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To determine whether and to what degree pork-barrel appropriations impact fundraising,
two series of estimates are undertaken for each dependent variable. First, aggregated porkbarrel spending and the other control variables are used to estimate the total amount of funds
raised by the incumbent. Next, the possibility of an electoral cycle in pork and pork-induced
donations are estimated using annual data for the three years leading up to the Senator’s reelection bid. The inclusion of annual values also explores whether timing is important when
considering the effects of pork-barrel spending on future fundraising.

3.4 Estimation and Analysis
The first dependent variable estimated is the total amount of money raised by the
incumbent in millions of dollars during the election cycle as in Krebs (2001) and Bonneau
(2007). The second dependent variable is the share of fundraising as the percentage of the
overall fundraising the incumbent accounted for in their specific race. For example, if the
incumbent raised $7 million and the challenger raised $3 million, then the incumbent would
have a 70% share of the fundraising as they raised $7 million of the $10 million total raised in
that specific electoral battle. Both Samuels (2002) and Stratmann (2013) use the share of
fundraising variable. The share of fundraising has several advantages over the total fundraising
variable. First, population does not matter when the share of fundraising is used as it is simply a
percentage of total fundraising. In addition, price level differences do not matter. Because the
spending in Senate campaigns can vary drastically, the fundraising advantage variable allows for
a more straightforward comparison of Senate races. The fundraising data are collected from the
Federal Election Commission and the Center for Responsive Politics’ ‘Open Secrets.’
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The first regression uses a pooled ordinary least squares regression (OLS) approach to
estimate total fundraising. The second estimate utilizes the yearly pork-barrel appropriations
during the election year and two years prior in lieu of the total, six-year pork-barrel
appropriations. Regressions 3 and 4 replicate the first two regressions using the share of
fundraising variable in place of the total fundraising variable.
Next, the same four regressions are repeated using federal aid to states instead of porkbarrel appropriations. Regression 5 uses the six-year federal outlays while regression 6 replaces
the aggregate appropriation with annual outlays during the election year and two year prior in
order to explore the possibility of an electoral cycle in the effects of state appropriations on
overall fund raising. Finally, regressions 7 and 8 replicate regressions 5 and 6 using the share of
fundraising variable in place of the total fundraising variable.
Unlike Samuels (2002) and Stratmann (2013), the present study includes federal elections
from 2004 to 2012 instead of a single election. Therefore, panel estimation techniques can be
used. Each of the eight regressions above are repeated using panel modeling techniques.

Results: OLS Estimates of Fundraising with Pork-Barrel Spending
Table 12 displays the results of the pooled OLS estimates of both total fundraising
(regressions 1-2) and share of fundraising (regressions 3-4) including both the aggregate porkbarrel appropriations and the yearly pork-barrel appropriations. For regressions 1 and 2, the
challenger fundraising variable is both significant and positively correlated with pork-barrel
spending in their states. In addition, cash-on-hand and the log of the population are all
significant and correlated with incumbent fundraising.

56

There are also two surprises in the results. First, the female variable is both positive and
significant which indicates that females may actually have a greater fundraising advantage. This
is likely due to women’s historical barriers to entry into the political arena. Females must
accumulate more fundraising than the average male candidate in order to increase
competitiveness in the election. The second surprise is that success in previous elections is
negatively correlated with total fundraising. This could be a result of popular incumbents not
needing to fundraise.
When pork-barrel spending is disaggregated based on years until re-election, $1 million
worth of pork-barrel spending in both the election year and the year prior lead to a $17,000
increase in fundraising. However, these estimates are not always sufficiently precise to
distinguish the coefficients from zero at the conventional levels of significance. In regression 1,
total pork-barrel appropriations are not significantly related to total fundraising.
Evidence of a pork-barrel electoral cycle effect is also evident. The amount of pork-barrel
spending two years before the Senator’s re-election bid and the amount of fundraising by said
Senator are negatively related. This result makes it seem as though additional pork-barrel
spending two years prior to the Senator’s election can actually reduce their fundraising
potential. While this may seem counterintuitive at first, it is important to remember that
Senators are elected during different years, so it is highly likely that a donor will attempt to
contribute to candidates standing for election in the year of interest. This is especially likely
when the two Senators belong to the same political party giving them an even greater incentive
to work together. So, even though the results make it seem as though the pork-barrel spending
during that time period are hurting the Senator’s fundraising, it is more likely that campaign
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contributions created by that pork-barrel spending are actually going to the other Senator in
the state. This fact is likely why the total pork-barrel spending from regression 1 is insignificant
as fundraising is going to shift among candidates based on the years to re-election. The three
other years of the term are not included because they did not yield any significant results.
Regressions 3 and 4 use the share of fundraising as the dependent variable. The log of the
population is not included because while the number of people in a state is likely to affect the
level of total fundraising, it does not impact the percentage of funds accounted for by the
incumbent. In addition, challenger fundraising is not included since it is already part of the
share of fundraising variable. As was the case with the first two regressions, the cash-on-hand
variable is significant. Unlike the first set of regressions, the previous general election
performance is positively correlated with share of fundraising.
However, as was the case with regression 1, the total pork-spending variable from
regression 3 is insignificant and seemingly unrelated to fundraising. Similar to regressions 1 and
2, the pork-barrel spending appropriated during the election year is both significant and
positively correlated with share of fundraising. Specifically, a $1 million increase in pork-barrel
spending leads to a 0.04% increase in the incumbent’s share of fundraising.
The first series of estimates shed light on the first two hypotheses of this paper. First, porkbarrel appropriations evidently have a positive impact on fundraising, other things being equal.
Second, the timing of pork-barrel spending matters. Partly because of electoral cycles, porkbarrel spending only seems to have an impact on fundraising in the election year. This suggests
that politicians have an incentive to properly time their appropriations, that is to say, to create
an electoral pork-barrel spending cycle. Donors evidently suffer from the ‘what have you done
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for me lately’ attitude, and consequently the incumbent should minimize the time between the
benefit to the potential donor and the time when donations are most needed.
Table 12: Pooled OLS Regressions using Pork-Barrel Spending (Regressions 1-4)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Total Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
Pork in Election Year
(in millions of $)
Pork Year Prior to Election
(in millions of $)
Pork Two Years Prior
(in millions of $)
Challenger Fundraising
(in millions of $)
Cash on Hand
(in millions of $)
Primary Election Challenger?
Previous Election Share
Log(Population)
House of Representatives
Terms
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
2012 Election
Constant

Total Fundraising (mil $)
(1)
(2)
0.000
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.021***
(0.006)
0.750***
0.744***
(0.079)
(0.077)
0.921***
0.819***
(0.156)
(0.152)
1.616
2.530*
(0.057)
(1.281)
-0.103*
-0.127**
(0.057)
(0.055)
5.182***
5.756***
(1.190)
(1.223)
0.373
0.636
(0.934)
(0.910)
0.169
0.189
(0.320)
(0.303)
2.115*
2.135*
(1.166)
(1.123)
1.004
0.555
(1.270)
(1.214)
1.700
1.542
(1.266)
(1.541)
0.626**
1.318
(1.365)
(1.323)
0.853
5.071**
(1.512)
(1.946)
7.574
8.255
(3.432)
(3.340)
117
117
0.686
0.720
17.30***
17.33***

Observations
R-squared
F-statistic
Dependent Variables
Regressions 1-2: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions 3-4: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent

Share of Fundraising (%)
(3)
(4)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.035*
(0.021)
-0.054**
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.021)

2.097***
(0.531)
-0.796
(4.646)
0.353*
(0.199)

2.085***
(0.523)
0.861
(4.623)
0.270
(0.200)

4.926
(3.301)
1.304
(1.112)
2.296
(4.115)
-4.989
(4.488)
0.868
(4.511)
-4.647
(4.798)
-4.320
(5.296)
55.515
(11.637)
117
0.249
3.17***

6.736**
(3.277)
1.542
(1.076)
1.796
(4.060)
-6.355
(4.368)
-8.839
(5.565)
-5.234
(4.735)
-6.870
(7.010)
63.207
(11.689)
117
0.303
3.44***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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OLS Estimates of Fundraising with Federal Appropriations
The next four regressions replicate the first four, this time using federal aid to states as
opposed to the more specific pork-barrel spending. As discussed, due to a reduction in federal
funding, the US Census stopped collecting the federal outlay data after 2010.
Table 13: Pooled OLS Regressions using Federal Aid to States (Regressions 5-8)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Total Federal Aid
(in millions of $)
Federal Aid in Election Year
(in millions of $)
Federal Aid Year Prior to Election
(in millions of $)
Federal Aid Two Years Prior
(in millions of $)
Challenger Fundraising
(in millions of $)
Cash on Hand
(in millions of $)
Primary Election Challenger?
Previous Election Share
Log(Population)
House of Representatives
Terms
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
Constant

Total Fundraising (mil $)
(5)
(6)
-0.001
(0.019)
-1.002**
(0.449)
0.784
(0.686)
0.544
(0.462)
0.803***
0.782***
(0.085)
(0.079)
0.893***
0.631***
(0.156)
(0.157)
1.807
1.731
(1.416)
(1.502)
-0.079
-0.070
(0.058)
(0.054)
5.770***
1.788
(1.448)
(1.501)
0.283
0.340
(0.990)
(0.919)
0.112
0.042
(0.315)
(0.289)
1.881
-0.094
(1.265)
(1.226)
0.771
-0.077
(1.257)
(1.213)
1.618
1.301
(1.146)
(1.156)
0.498
1.274
(1.355)
(1.347)
5.704
6.459
(3.534)
(3.285)
101
101
0.714
0.765
18.27***
19.96***

Observations
R-squared
F-statistic
Dependent Variables
Regressions 5-6: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions 7-8: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent

Fundraising Advantage (%)
(7)
(8)
-0.014
(0.031)
0.686
(1.725)
-3.181
(2.600)
2.589
(1.714)

1.698***
(0.535)
-6.092
(4.999)
0.393*
(0.200)

1.784***
(0.583)
-5.557
(5.027)
0.382*
(0.202)

4.709
(3.491)
0.296
(1.107)
-2.560
(4.481)
-5.134
(4.404)
0.966
(4.461)
-3.196
(4.745)
54.861
(11.677)
101
0.253
3.05***

5.448
(3.525)
0.335
(1.110)
-1.996
(4.709)
-6.813
(4.595)
1.320
(4.456)
-1.375
(5.157)
54.524
(11.722)
101
0.272
2.75***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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Therefore, these regressions cover the Senatorial general elections from 2004-2010. The
results are displayed in table 13. For each of the regressions, the control variables behave in
much the same way as they did in regressions 1-4, so I will not repeat the results. The main
difference between pork-barrel spending and federal aid is that there is no significant
relationship between federal aid and fundraising other than the federal aid appropriated during
the election year which is actually negatively correlated with total fundraising. These results
support the hypothesis that general federal appropriations do not have the same impact on
fundraising. Even when federal spending such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid are
excluded, there is still no discernable linkage between federal aid spending and fundraising.

Panel Estimates of Fundraising with Pork-Barrel Spending
Even though the pooled OLS results support the three hypotheses regarding the impact
pork-barrel spending and appropriation spending have on fundraising, a panel approach is used
as a robustness check. I repeat the previous eight regressions using panel estimates. The
Hausman Test indicates that a fixed effect model should be used when the dependent variable
is total fundraising while a random effect model should be used when the dependent variable is
the incumbent’s share of fundraising. This result is not surprising as the total fundraising
variable, due to being measured in millions of dollars, is easily impacted by state-specific
conditions such as population, price-level and being a “swing-state.”
Table 14: Hausman Test Results
Regression
Total Fundraising – Total Pork Spending
Total Fundraising – Yearly Pork Spending
Fundraising Percent – Total Pork Spending
Fundraising Percent – Yearly Pork Spending
H0: A random effects model should be used.
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Chi-Squared Statistic
124.23**
31.13*
5.83
5.95
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I continue to use the election year binary variables in order to control for the election year.
The years after the 2008 financial crisis would, for example, be associated with increased
targeted and general spending, but donors may have had less income to make donations from.
Table 15 gives the estimates for regressions 9-12. The results are similar to the estimates
from regressions 1-4 with only minor differences. First of all, the control variables in all four
cases continue to behave similarly to the pooled OLS regressions. Again, challenger fundraising,
service in the House of Representatives, the number of terms served and being female are all
significant and positively correlated with total fundraising. Second, the regressions utilizing the
total incumbent fundraising variable continue to provide more robust results.
Again, pork-barrel spending influences fundraising but only when properly timed.
Specifically, when $1 million worth of pork-barrel money is brought into the state during the
Senator’s election year, the Senator is able to increase their fundraising by $24,000; that is, an
additional dollar of fundraising costs around $42 worth of pork-barrel money. A key difference
between the panel results and pooled OLS results is that total pork-barrel spending does seem
to be significant and positively correlated with total fundraising. This indicates that pork-barrel
spending throughout a Senator’s entire term does have a net positive effect on their
fundraising. Additionally, pork-barrel spending continues to influence the percent of fundraising
by the incumbent, but only when properly timed.
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Table 15: Panel Regressions using Pork-Barrel Spending (Regressions 9-12)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Total Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
Pork in Election Year
(in millions of $)
Pork Year Prior to Election
(in millions of $)
Pork Two Years Prior
(in millions of $)
Challenger Fundraising
(in millions of $)
Cash on Hand
(in millions of $)
Primary Election Challenger?
Previous General Election Share
House of Representatives
Terms
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
2012 Election
Constant

Total Fundraising (mil $)
(9)
(10)
0.005*
(0.003)
0.024***
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.013)
0.719***
0.706***
(0.089)
(0.083)
0.526*
0.395
(0.286)
(0.261)
2.237
2.839**
(1.480)
(1.379)
-0.133*
-0.172**
(0.081)
(0.075)
1.003
2.046*
(1.184)
(1.114)
0.770*
0.893**
(0.407)
(0.375)
5.834***
5.346***
(1.759)
(1.604)
0.290
0.829
(1.372)
(1.217)
2.705*
2.143
(1.453)
(1.626)
1.114
1.576
(1.390)
(1.281)
3.401*
5.860***
(1.862)
(2.018)
4.880
7.944
(5.189)
(4.671)
117
117
49
49
0.637
0.706
8.07***
9.27***

Fundraising Advantage (%)
(11)
(12)
-0.003
(0.002)
0.035*
(0.021)
-0.054**
(0.021)
-0.020
(0.021)

2.098***
(0.531)
-0.796
(4.646)
0.353*
(0.199)
4.926
(3.301)
1.304
(1.112)
2.296
(4.115)
-4.989
(4.488)
0.868
(4.511)
-4.647
(4.798)
-4.320
(5.295)
55.515
(11.637)
117
49
0.129
34.83***

Observations
Groups
R-squared
F/Wald-statistic
Dependent Variables
Regressions 9-10: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $) – Fixed Effects
Regressions 11-12: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent – Random Effects

2.085***
(0.522)
0.860
(4.623)
0.270**
(0.197
6.736
(3.277)
1.542
(1.076)
1.796
(4.060)
-6.355
(4.368)
-8.839
(5.565)
-5.234
(4.735)
-6.870
(7.010)
63.207
(11.689)
117
49
0.190
44.71***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Panel Estimates of Fundraising with Federal Aid
I continue the analysis by repeating the four fundraising regressions which utilize the
federal aid variables instead of the pork-barrel spending variables. Again, the Hausman Test
indicates that a fixed effects model should be used when the dependent variable is total
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fundraising and a random effects model should be used when the dependent variable is the
share of incumbent fundraising. The result of each of the Hausman tests is given below.
Table 16: Hausman Test Results II
Regression
Total Fundraising – Total Pork Spending
Total Fundraising – Yearly Pork Spending
Fundraising Percent – Total Pork Spending
Fundraising Percent – Yearly Pork Spending
H0: A random effects model should be used.
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Chi-Squared Statistic
30.12***
19.37*
4.29
3.48

Table 17 gives the estimates for regressions 13-16. Again, the results are similar to the
estimates from regressions 5-8. Each of the control variables behaves in exactly the same way
as they did in regressions 5-8. One difference is that using the panel approach appears to show
that federal aid spending is correlated with total fundraising although the total effect is
ambiguous.

Implications of Estimates
Overall, the above results support the three hypotheses stated at the beginning of the
paper. First, pork-barrel spending can have a positive and significant impact on fundraising.
Second, the timing of the pork-barrel spending matters. To be specific, only pork-barrel
spending in the election year seems to have an impact on campaign contributions. Third, the
relationship between federal aid to states and incumbent fundraising is ambiguous; but, it is
clear that amount of fundraising per dollar of pork-barrel spending is far greater than the
amount of fundraising per dollar of federal aid.
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Table 17: Panel Regressions using Federal Aid (Regressions 13-16)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Total Federal Aid
(in billions of $)
Federal Aid in Election Year
(in billions of $)
Federal Aid Year Prior to Election
(in billions of $)
Federal Aid Two Years Prior
(in billions of $)
Challenger Fundraising
(in millions of $)
Cash on Hand
(in millions of $)
Primary Election Challenger?
Previous General Election Share
House of Representatives
Terms
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
Constant

Total Fundraising (mil $)
(13)
(14)
-0.015
(0.026)
-1.430***
(0.459)
0.845
(0.757)
1.642***
(0.557)
0.752***
0.705***
(0.106)
(0.089)
0.466
0.233
(0.314)
(0.264)
2.553
2.692*
(1.865)
(1.515)
-0.082
-0.030
(0.093)
(0.076)
0.244
0.264
(1.341)
(1.131)
0.486
0.474
(0.476)
(0.393)
4.616*
4.301**
(2.251)
(1.888)
0.584
-1.231
(1.412)
(1.245)
2.745*
1.407
(1.572)
(1.353)
0.949
1.013
(1.420)
(1.460)
8.696
-1.421
(5.454)
(5.091)
101
101
49
49
0.650
0.776
6.92***
10.38***

Fundraising Advantage (%)
(15)
(16)
-0.014
(0.031)
0.686
(1.725)
-3.181
(2.600)
2.589
(1.713)

1.698***
(0.535)
-6.092
(4.999)
0.393**
(0.200)
4.709
(3.491)
0.296
(1.107)
-2.560
(4.481)
-5.134
(4.403)
0.966
(4.461)
-3.196
(4.745)
54.860
(11.677)
101
49
0.114
30.49***

Observations
Groups
R-squared
F/Wald-statistic
Dependent Variables
Regressions 13-14: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $) – Fixed Effects
Regressions 15-16: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent – Random Effects

1.784***
(0.583)
-5.556
(5.027)
0.382*
(0.202)
5.448
(3.523)
0.335
(1.110)
-1.996
(4.709)
-6.813
(4.595)
1.320
(4.456)
-1.375
(5.157)
54.524
(11.722)
101
49
0.144
32.94***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

These results suggest that legislators should prefer pork-barrel spending over general
appropriations for their states, possibly because the former are more visible and easier to take
credit for. It would be difficult for a single Senator to claim credit for a change in the entire
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Women, Infant and Children (WIC) system. However, a Senator could claim credit for a new
highway, park, museum, or federal building in their state. This also lends support to
universalism hypothesis of Weingast (1994), which states that politicians are likely to work
together on targeted spending bills, because it is in their respective fundraising interests to do
so.

Caveats and Estimation Issues
There are several variables which were not included in this study. The first is a party-based
binary variable to determine if the legislator’s political party impacts fundraising. Theoretically,
this is not appropriate as there is very little evidence that a Senator’s party impacts fundraising.
Even though there is anecdotal evidence that Republicans have a greater ability to fundraise,
there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. For example, Barack Obama raised $80
million more than Mitt Romney in the 2012 presidential election even when PAC contributions
are included.
Secondly, some studies use per capita measures. This is problematic for several reasons.
First, it does not allow for a simple interpretation of the estimates. Instead of being able to
estimate the number of dollars needed to increase fundraising by $1, all of the values are based
on the size of the population. More importantly, estimates of per capita campaign spending are
very weak and do not shine much direct light on the questions of interest here.
Another possible change that could be made is to compare similar spending types. For
example, there is enough available data to compare the impact of pork-barrel spending
included in a transportation omnibus bill compared to the impact of federal spending by the
Department of Transportation. As previously mentioned, Senators have much less control over
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the amount of money spent by executive agencies of the government. Therefore, incumbents
can use pork-barrel spending to steer money to projects which they believe will provide a
greater personal benefit.

3.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that pork-barrel spending has a positive impact on an
incumbent’s ability to fundraise.
By extending past research by Krebs (2001), Samuels (2002), Bonneau (2007) and Stratmann
(2013), I was able to model and estimate an incumbent Senator’s ability to fundraise for reelection. The main novelty of the above estimates was the use disaggregated pork-barrel
appropriations. When using total fundraising, a ten million dollar increase in pork-barrel
appropriations in the election year leads to somewhere between a $170,000 to $240,000
increase in fundraising. When the share of fundraising is used as the dependent variable, the
relationship is similar. Specifically, a $10 million increase in pork-barrel spending leads to a
0.35% increase in the incumbent’s fundraising share. This result is in line with the total
fundraising results.
In addition, the results are robust as similar estimates are obtained using pooled OLS
estimates and panel estimates. The results also suggest that state federal appropriations may
increase fundraising by Senators, although less so than targeted expenditures. This supports the
hypothesis that legislators prefer to use pork-barrel spending, other things being equal,
because the results are more visible, easier to take credit for and easier to direct to certain
parties.
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3.6 Appendix: The Case of Competitive Elections
In this section, I consider the situation where only the race is relatively competitive.
Specifically, I only include a race if the incumbent receives less than 70% of the vote in the
general election. Even though this threshold is relatively high, it cuts out nearly 20% of the
available data. Reducing the threshold to 60% would eliminate 50 more races.
For the sake of time, I only include the four original pooled OLS regressions. The results are
given below in table 18. The control variables behave just as they did in the original, untrimmed
regressions. But, the main contribution from this change is the impact of the new data set on
the pork-barrel spending variables. Specifically, the pork-barrel spending during the election
year continues to be both significant and positively correlated with both fundraising dependent
variables, but the coefficient is larger. In fact, incumbents facing a greater challenge in the
general election can generate 10-20% more campaign contributions per million dollars of porkbarrel spending than unchallenged incumbents. This indicates that incumbents in closer races
are able to increase their fundraising by a larger amount.
This result further establishes the main hypothesis of the paper that legislators can use
pork-barrel spending to increase their fundraising. Consequently, politicians who face a tighter
race feel an additional sense of urgency which is translated into a greater need to fundraise. In
this situation, incumbents attempt to get the greatest return possible from their appropriations
of pork-barrel money.
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Table 18: Competitive Pooled OLS Regressions using Pork-Barrel Spending (Regressions 1-4)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Total Pork Spending
(in millions of $)
Pork in Election Year
(in millions of $)
Pork Year Prior to Election
(in millions of $)
Pork Two Years Prior
(in millions of $)
Challenger Fundraising
(in millions of $)
Cash on Hand
(in millions of $)
Primary Election Challenger?
Previous Election Share
Log(Population)
House of Representatives
Terms
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
2012 Election
Constant

Total Fundraising (mil $)
(1)
(2)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.026***
(0.007)
0.724***
0.717***
(0.086)
(0.082)
0.788***
0.626***
(0.202)
(0.192)
1.593
2.573**
(1.440)
(1.372)
-0.119
-0.176**
(0.076)
(0.073)
5.971***
6.733***
(1.414)
(1.415)
0.099
0.480
(1.066)
(1.018)
0.235
0.363
(0.406)
(0.382)
1.980
1.807*
(1.306)
(1.224)
1.483
0.998
(1.496)
(1.386)
1.516
1.183
(1.497)
(1.578)
0.973
2.107
(1.668)
(1.580)
0.661
6.056***
(1.733)
(2.198)
8.449
10.542
(4.329)
(4.165)
99
99
0.649
0.705
12.11***
13.19***

Observations
R-squared
F-statistic
Dependent Variables
Regressions 1-2: Total Fundraising by Incumbent (in millions of $)
Regressions 3-4: Percentage of Fundraising by Incumbent

Share of Fundraising (%)
(3)
(4)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.041*
(0.023)
-0.059***
(0.022)
-0.014
(0.023)

2.426***
(0.659)
2.426
(0.659)
0.232*
(0.260)

2.359***
(0.645)
3.452
(4.806)
0.068
(0.260)

4.766
(3.627)
1.319
(1.364)
2.559
(4.427)
-6.440
(5.069)
-0.503
(5.127)
-7.619
(5.599)
-4.723
(5.781)
60.530
(14.426)
99
0.216
2.18**

7.007*
(3.585)
1.899
(1.330)
1.521
(4.324)
-7.643
(4.874)
-11.597**
(6.212)
-7.927
(5.500)
-7.583
(7.732)
71.936
(14.539)
99
0.287
2.63***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Pork-Barrel Spending on Electoral
Success
Abstract
As discussed in the previous two chapters of this dissertation, pork-barrel spending
can be used by incumbents for an electoral advantage. What has yet to be considered
is the actual impact on an incumbent’s re-election chances. This papers uses both a
two-stage and three-stage least squares approach to identify the main determinants
of an incumbent’s share of the votes in the general election. Instead of looking for a
direct link between pork-barrel spending and electoral success, I posit that there is
actually an indirect linkage. Specifically, I hypothesize that pork-barrel spending has a
positive impact on fundraising and said fundraising increases the likelihood of
incumbent re-election. I find that for every $10 million of pork-barrel spending, the
incumbent’s share of fundraising increases by 0.10% and for every 1% increase in
share of fundraising, the incumbent increases their vote share by about 0.14%.
Therefore, a $1 million increase in pork-barrel spending can lead to a 0.10% increase
in vote share.

4.1 Introduction
It is generally believed that politicians are able to bolster their chances for re-election
through the use of pork-barrel spending. Theoretical models produced by both economists and
political scientists predict that politicians who are able to secure federal funding for their state
or district will increase their chances of being re-elected (Inman and Fitts 1990; Bickers and
Stein 1996; Levitt and Snyder 1997; Stratmann 2013). But, even with the theoretical
foundations, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence that such an effect actually exists.
Even so, many politicians appear to believe that securing federal funds will increase their
likelihood of being re-elected based on their continued usage of pork-barrel spending.
For example, the Hurricane Sandy relief bill, in theory, should have been full of benefits for
the citizens of the disaster-ravaged region. In turn, the voters in the area would reward their
legislators for the disaster assistance by voting them back into office. Therefore, legislators
inside of this geographical area would be able reap positive electoral benefits. Those electoral
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benefits could be extended to other regions by including additional targeted expenditures, and
this was evidently done. The total Hurricane Sandy disaster relief bill had over $50 billion in
spending with much of it having nothing to do with the actual Hurricane Sandy disaster. This
illustrates legislators’ strong attraction to pork-barrel spending. In addition, it supports the
belief that logrolling is likely to occur even with disaster relief (Congleton 2006; Sobel, Coyne et
al. 2007).
Pork-barrel projects may increase the likelihood of an incumbent being re-elected through
three channels. First, they may increase the number of votes received if constituents see
tangible improvements through pork-funded projects. For instance, constituents may reward
their legislator for securing funds for a new museum or highway. Second, pork-barrel spending
may improve the economic conditions of an area. If the legislator is able to create jobs or
increase income levels through pork-barrel spending, such results should increase the chance of
being re-elected. Third, legislators may funnel pork-barrel money into projects which benefit
concentrated groups in their districts. Said groups may then choose to reward the incumbent
by donating to their re-election campaign. The additional campaign contributions would be
used to increase the likelihood of being re-elected. This paper examines the third channel.

4.2 Pork-Barrel Spending, Fundraising and Electoral Success
Attempting to determine what factors influence electoral success is not a new endeavor. In
general, the amount of money a legislator spends during a campaign has consistently been
shown to be directly related to their success in the election (Palda 1973; Welch 1974; Palda
1975; Dawson and Zinser 1976; Welch 1976; Stratmann 2013). One important distinction that
must be made when studying elections is the difference between an incumbent, the politician
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currently holding the office, and the challenger, the politician attempting to win the
incumbent’s office. While some early studies have incorrectly grouped incumbents and the
challengers together into a single analysis (Glantz, Abramowitz et al. 1976; Jacobson 1976),
later studies have recognized that incumbents have a distinct advantage over challengers in
their reelection campaigns13.
Some of the incumbency advantage is derived from the link between the likelihood of a
candidate being elected and the probability of someone donating to their campaign. Because
incumbents have already shown potential contributors they can win an election, the incumbent
is more likely to receive campaign contributions (Welch 1974; Ban-Zion and Eytan 1975;
Dawson and Zinser 1976; Welch 1977; Pastine and Pastine 2012). Thus, there is a self-fulfilling
prophecy when it comes to campaign financing. Candidates can only be successful if they are
able to fundraise; but, successful candidates have an easier time fundraising. This has become
an even bigger issue due to the high-cost of advertising coupled with the effectiveness of
campaign advertisements aired on television (Stratmann 2006).
Another reason incumbents have an advantage is due to their ability to indirectly use tax
revenues to campaign for re-election. Incumbents can use their office to create programs which
provide benefits to potential voters in their district (Cover 1976; Perdue 1977; Jacobson 1978;
Grossman and Helpman 1994; Erikson and Palfrey 2000). This essentially permits incumbents to
use taxpayer money, often in the form of targeted expenditures, to increase their support

13

For example, Erikson 1971, Erikson 1972, Mayhew 1974, Ferejohn 1977, Fiorina 1977, Born 1979, Alford and
Brady 1981, Collie 1981, Krehbiel and Wright 1983, Garand and Gross 1984, Cain, Ferejohn et al. 1987, Jacobson
1987, Ansolabehere, Brady et al. 1988, Alford and Niemi 1989, Gelman and King 1990, Jacobson 1990, King and
Gelman 1991, Cox and Katz 1996, Levitt and Wolfram 1997, Ansolabehere, Synder et al. 2000, Hodler, Loertscher
et al. 2010.
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among voters and campaign donors. Unless challengers already have some existing legislative
position, they must rely solely on promises to generate such support.
Of course, simply bringing federal money into a state may not be enough. A significant
number of voters or donors have to assign credit for it to incumbents. Many federal programs
award funding to states through the use of grant processes which are not directly controlled by
the legislator. Because the legislator cannot easily take direct credit for general spending, it is
not likely to be as beneficial for re-election as more visible, targeted expenditures. Pork-barrel
spending provides clearer evidence of an incumbent influence in Congress. Without project
visibility, earmark spending is not likely to be an effective method of increasing re-election
chances (Stein and Bickers 1994).
Even with plenty of anecdotal evidence highlighting the popularity of pork-barrel spending
in Congress, there remains a good deal of controversy over the magnitude of the effect of
targeted expenditures on re-election prospects (Evans 2004).” Several papers have concluded
that pork-barrel spending does not have an impact on an incumbent’s chances of being reelected (Feldman and Jondrow 1984; Stein and Bickers 1995; Frisch 1998).
On the other hand, there is also research that suggests that federal spending in one’s
district or state has a positive impact on electability (Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast
1981; Weingast, Shepsle et al. 1981; Niou and Ordeshook 1985; Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987;
Inman 1988; Inman and Fitts 1990; Bickers and Stein 1996; Shepsle, Dickson et al. 2002; Keefer
and Khemani 2009). For example, Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that for each additional $100
per capita that a legislator is able to secure for his or her district, the likelihood of re-election
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increases by approximately 2%. The important caveat is that constituents must be aware that
federal money is being funneled into the district.
In a recent study, Stratmann (2013) points out that one of the major drawbacks of previous
research is that it does not distinguish between federally-awarded money and earmarks. A
district can receive a large amount of federal assistance but this may have little to do with the
legislator’s ability to secure federal funding, because so many federal grants are distributed
through formulas that are not directly impacted by individual state or district legislators.
Stratmann finds evidence that the average incumbent increases his or her share of the vote by
around 1% by increasing federal earmark spending by $50 million. This amounts to a $15 per
capita increase in a district with a population of 650,000 residents (Stratmann 2013). However,
Stratmann’s research does not fully explain the motivation of the legislator. The goal of this
paper is to determine why politicians are attracted to pork-barrel spending.
A complete model of electoral success has to simultaneously account for pork-barrel
spending, fundraising, and electability. The difficulty in modeling the relationship between the
three variables is the endogoneity.
Consider the relationship between fundraising and electoral success. A candidate can
increase his or her likelihood of reelection by securing additional fundraising money, but a
candidate who is likely to win an election is also more likely to raise additional funds. As a
consequence, there is a bidirectional relationship between fundraising and electability. This
causes the results from an ordinary least squares analysis to be biased. In addition, a candidate
who is almost guaranteed to win may not actually need fundraising assistance. Robert C. Byrd,
the late senator from West Virginia, never received less than 64% of the popular vote in any bid
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for re-election; therefore, he was able to rely on his name and reputation rather than
fundraising to win elections—which was partly associated with his amazing ability to secure
targeted grants for his state.

Figure 4: The Connection Between Pork-Barrel Spending, Fundraising and Electability

Each of the above links have been studied independently of one. There are many papers on the
link between fundraising and electability (for example, Bonneau (2007) and Abrams and Settle
(2004)).There are also papers on the link between electability and fundraising (for example,
Dawson and Zinser (1976) and Welch (1977).) A few researchers have also attempted to
determine the impact of pork-barrel spending on electability (for example, Levitt and Snyder
(1997) and Stratmann (2013)). The previous chapter of this dissertation studies the link
between pork-barrel spending and fundraising. Samuels (2002) contends that pork-barrel
spending does create electoral gains but indirectly. Samuels finds that legislators in Brazil
increase their likelihood of re-election by engaging in pork-barrel projects, but the increased
likelihood is due to the increased fundraising which is a result of the pork-barrel projects
(Samuels 2002).

75

Overall, these papers suggest that simultaneous equation bias is likely to be a problem for
much of the literature. This paper attempts to overcome that problem estimating pork-barrel
spending, fundraising and electoral success together in a single empirical analysis. The results
suggest that pork-barrel spending does not impact electability; instead, pork-barrel spending
increases an incumbent’s ability to fundraise and said fundraising is responsible for the increase
in electability.

4.3 Data and Modeling
I use a model based on Samuels (2002) and an estimation strategy that is similar to
Stratmann (2013). Following Samuels, three hypotheses are tested: first that pork-barrel
spending does not directly help incumbents win elections, second that pork-barrel spending
increases an incumbent’s access to campaign fundraising and third that money helps
incumbents win reelection. If each of the three hypotheses is shown to be true, then I will have
sufficient evidence to prove the main thesis of this paper: pork-barrel spending does not
directly impact an incumbent’s chances of winning an election; instead, pork-barrel spending
has a positive impact on fundraising which subsequently increases the likelihood of re-election.
Even though the Samuels paper focuses on the Brazilian political system, I will show that the
same three hypotheses hold true for the United States Senate.
For purposes of estimation, I use a two-stage least squares vote share model based on
Stratmann (2013) with one crucial deviation. In Stratmann’s model, the first stage determines
the factors important to the appropriation of earmarks. Then, using the results from the first
stage, factors such as earmark appropriations, political affiliation, fundraising, past electoral
success and experience are determined to be the main drivers of electoral success. I believe
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that the relationship between pork-barrel spending and fundraising occurs in the opposite
direction. Therefore, I estimate the impact of pork-barrel spending on fundraising in the first
stage and then, using the results from the first stage, estimate the factors which influence vote
share. As an extension, I use simultaneous equations with a three stage least squares approach.
The three-stage estimation method may be a useful extension due to the likely correlation of
error term disturbances.
In addition to this differences in the first stage, this paper considers Senatorial elections
over a period of five terms, whereas Stratmann’s research focuses on the House of for a single
election. But, even with the differences, the spirit of the analysis is similar to that of Stratmann
(2013): there are factors which may influence an incumbent’s ability to be re-elected, but some
of the factors may only have an indirect impact.

The Model
In order to test the three hypotheses detailed earlier, I first estimate the following model:
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
where the dependent variable is the percentage of an incumbent’s vote share in the general
election, the pork variable is the amount of pork-barrel spending accumulated by the state,
fundraising is the amount of money fundraised by the incumbent and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control
variables which are discussed shortly. But, assuming that my first hypothesis is true, pork-barrel
spending will not be significantly correlated with the incumbent’s election percentage.
In addition, incumbents have incentives to respond to a tight race by increasing their
fundraising. Therefore, fundraising may actually indicate electoral weakness. Because the actual
“closeness” of the race is often unobserved and unmeasurable, the estimation of the
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fundraising variable may be biased downward. Therefore, an appropriate instrument must be
used.
For an instrument to be valid, it cannot be correlated with the incumbent’s vote share but
must be correlated with campaign fundraising. I contend that pork-barrel spending can be used
as an instrument. I test my first hypothesis that pork-barrel spending does not directly influence
the incumbent’s vote share. This would indicate that there is no correlation between the
dependent variable and the instrument. Next, I test my second hypothesis that pork-barrel
spending increases an incumbent’s ability to fundraise. This verifies that the instrument is
correlated with the variable being instrumented. As long as both hypotheses are verified, a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach may be used.
The first-stage is estimated as
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛿2 𝑧𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑟𝑘
where 𝑧𝑘 are other instruments used in this study, 𝑋𝑖 is the vector of variables exogenous to
incumbent election percentage and 𝑟𝑘 is the error term. Then, the second stage is estimated as:
̂
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽𝑗 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 .
Assuming that the instrumented variable is significant, the third hypothesis of this paper will
hold verifying each of the three hypotheses.
As a test of robustness, I also consider a simultaneous equation approach using a three
stage least squares (3SLS) regression is applicable. The two simultaneous equations used are
(1)𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝛿2 𝑧𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘
(2)𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 .
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Data
Data on the incumbent was collected for all Senators vying for re-election from 2004-2012.
The main independent variable is the Senator’s fundraising in the current election. Two
different measures of fundraising are used. First, the total amount of money fundraised during
the current election cycle, in millions of dollars, is used. This allows for a straightforward
analysis on the impact on fundraising on electoral success. In addition to the total amount
fundraised, I also consider the percentage of total fundraising raised by the incumbent. For
instance, if the incumbent raises $15 million and the challenger raises $5 million, then out of
the combined $20 million raised for this race, 75% is raised by the incumbent. Samuels (2002)
and Stratmann (2013) see this treatment of fundraising as superior to a nominal total
fundraising variable for several reasons. First, it allows for state-to-state comparisons. Second,
population does not matter when the share of fundraising is used as it is simply a percentage of
total fundraising. Third, price level differences do not matter. Because the spending in Senate
campaigns can vary drastically, the fundraising advantage variable allows for a more
straightforward comparison of Senate races.
In addition to the money raised during the current election cycle, cash-on-hand can also
create an advantage for the incumbent as it represents monies which are carried over from a
previous election cycle. Politicians can bank unused campaign contributions for use in future,
more competitive races.
In order to account for the challenge faced by the incumbent, I also include the total
amount fundraised by the incumbent’s challenger. Generally speaking, as the amount of money
raised by the challenger increases, the challenge faced by the incumbent increases as well.
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Characteristics of individual senators were also collected. First, I use a party binary variable
which has a value of one if the Senator is a Democrat. While political affiliation is not likely to
matter when it comes to fundraising, party affiliation is important in elections because voter
policy preferences vary among the states. In addition, I also use a binary variable to account for
the sex of the Senator. If the incumbent is a female, then the binary variable has a value of one.
This variable is included due to the historical barriers of entry experienced by females,
especially those associated with the upper house of Congress, which might affect their ability to
secure targeted expenditures.
The number of terms variable measures the seniority of the Senator as the number of terms
served in the Senate. As the number of terms increases, politicians gain more power in the
Senate which can be leveraged into greater visibility. This gives the Senator an advantage over
challengers, especially those without past experience. Because this variable only considers the
Senator’s experience in the Senate, I also include a binary variable which has a value of one if
the Senator previously was a member of the House of Representatives.
Just as experience impacts electability, past success does as well. Thus, the percentage of
the votes received in the previous Senate general election is used. With incumbency re-election
rates at between 85 and 90 percent14, Senators with past electoral success are likely to have
similar successes in the future.
Finally, due to the use of state-level data, two modifications of the usual electoral models
were required. Instead of representing a single district, a Senator represents an entire state
with a second Senator which creates an opportunity for cooperation. Therefore, a binary

14

This fact is also why a probit model cannot be used.
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variable is used which has a value of one if both Senators from the state belong to the same
party. Second, because the dependent variable is the percentage of the vote received in the
previous general election, only Senators who were elected to a full term are included.
Therefore, Senators who entered office unelected or through a special election are not
included. Since 2004, there are 117 incumbent who served full terms.
Because I use a two-stage regression, there are three instruments used to instrument the
fundraising variables. The first is pork-barrel spending. Data on pork-barrel spending are taken
from the Citizens Against Government Waste data set. Pork-barrel money appropriated to a
state follows an electoral cycle. Instead of measuring the amount of pork-barrel spending
appropriated to a state each year, I measure the amount of pork-barrel spending based on the
number of years to the incumbent’s re-election. Specifically, I use the yearly pork-barrel
spending for the three years leading to the re-election15. Because it is impossible to distinguish
between the individual efforts of each Senator, the total amount of pork-barrel spending
appropriated by the state is used.
Second, the log of the population of the state is used as an instrument. The population is
correlated with total fundraising as a larger population will lead to a greater number of
potential donors. On the other hand, population is not correlated with the incumbent election
percentage. Finally, time-effects are used to control for the year of the election in the first
stage. I have shown that time effects are significant when estimating fundraising but I also
found that time effects are not significant in the vote share regression. Therefore, time effects

15

I discuss the reasoning in further depth as well as alternative approaches in the previous chapter.
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can be used as an instrument. The descriptive statistics and the sources of the data are included
in table 19.
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for State-Level Regression
Variable

Source
FEC

Obs.
117

Mean
61.22

St. Dev.
10.32

Min
36.08

Max
100

Incumbent Fundraising (millions of $)

FEC

117

10.762

7.481

1.444

51.567

Challenger Fundraising (millions of $)

FEC

117

4.060

5.847

0.001

28.162

Fundraising Advantage (in %)

FEC

117

81.354

17.416

36.222

99.992

Democrat*

Congress

117

0.538

0.501

0

1

Number of Terms in Current Office

Congress

117

2.521

1.705

1.000

8.000

Percentage of vote in previous general election

FEC

117

60.876

9.316

47.880

99.000

Incumbent faced challenger in primary?*

FEC

117

0.436

0.498

0.000

1.000

Congress

117

0.761

0.429

0

1

OpenSecrets

117

1.726

2.918

0.000

17.800

House of Representatives*

Congress

117

0.564

0.498

0.000

1.000

Female*

Congress

117

0.197

0.399

0.000

1.000

Log(Population)

Census

117

0.571

0.461

-0.292

1.580

Pork-Barrel Funding during election year

CAGW

117

166.427

151.641

0.000

733.634

Pork-Barrel Funding year prior

CAGW

117

125.093

135.391

0.000

588.800

Pork-Barrel Funding two years prior

CAGW

117

187.558

138.218

16.600

671.800

Percent of Vote in General Election

Both Senators belong to same party?*
Cash-on-Hand (millions of dollars)

Note: Variables marked with an asterisk are binary variables.

4.4 Estimation and Analysis
The dependent variable estimated is the percentage of the votes the incumbent received in
the general election. To generate a baseline, the first set of regressions use a pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) approach. For each set of estimations, I run one regression with the total
incumbent fundraising variable and one regression with the percent of incumbent fundraising
variable. When the percent of fundraising advantage variable is used, the challenger fundraising
variable and the log of the population variable are dropped.
In addition to the first two baseline regressions, I also run two pooled OLS regressions
including the pork-barrel spending variables. The inclusion of these independent variables
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allows for the test of the first hypothesis: that pork-barrel spending does not directly help
incumbents win elections. As long as pork-barrel spending is not correlated with incumbent
vote share, both the first hypothesis and the acceptability of pork-barrel spending as an
instrument will be verified.
Next, I repeat my first two regressions using the 2SLS approach. The first stage estimates
the factors which impact political fundraising, including pork-barrel spending. The second stage
uses the instrumented fundraising variable in addition to other factors to determine what
factors influence the incumbent vote share. As a test of robustness, I repeat the two 2SLS
regressions using a panel 2SLS approach.
Because of the relationships between pork-barrel spending, campaign fundraising and
electoral success, a simultaneous equations approach that accounts for error dependencies
may be appropriate. The two original regressions are thus re-estimated with a three stage least
squares (3SLS) regression using the system of equations previously discussed. The three stage
results also provide evidence of the robustness of the 2SLS estimates.

OLS Baseline Results
I begin by conducting a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) to determine a baseline for the
eventual two-stage and three-stage estimates. The results are displayed below in Table 20. In
regressions 1 and 2, the total incumbent fundraising variable is not significant. As mentioned,
the likely endogoneity associated with this variable can cause a downward bias creating a
motivation for a two or three stage approach. In addition, the incumbent’s performance in the
last general election and cash on hand are both shown to be significant and positively related to
electoral success. On the other hand, facing a challenger in the primary negatively impacts
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performance in the general election. This is likely because additional resources were required
simply to make it into the general election.
Regressions 3 and 4 use the incumbent share of fundraising variable. In both of the
regressions, the share of fundraising variable is shown to be both significant and positively
correlated with vote share. Specifically, a 1% increase in the share of incumbent fundraising
leads to a 0.33% increase in vote share. The other control variables discussed in the previous
paragraph all maintain their relationship with the incumbent vote share variable.
Regressions 2 and 4 add pork-barrel spending variables to the baseline results to determine
if they are correlated with electoral success. In general, pork-barrel spending is not correlated
with electoral success. There is a relationship between pork-barrel spending one year before
the election and electoral success, but this is effect is very small. In any case, there is evidence
that pork-barrel spending is not directly correlated with the share of votes in Senate elections.
This result supports the first hypothesis that pork-barrel spending does not directly help
incumbents win elections. Subsequently, pork-barrel spending is an appropriate instrument due
to the lack of correlation between it and electoral success.
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Table 20: Pooled OLS Regressions (Regressions 1-4)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Vote Incumbent Received in Senate General Election
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
Incumbent Fundraising Share
0.333***
(as % of total fundraising)
(0.044)
Total Incumbent Fundraising
-0.080
-0.036
(millions of $)
(0.152)
(0.159)
Total Challenger Fundraising
-0.700***
-0.719***
(millions of $)
(0.184)
(0.189)
Democrat
2.001
1.868
1.709
(1.520)
(1.554)
(1.395)
Number of Terms
-0.072
0.023
-0.187
(0.525)
(0.553)
(0.485)
% of Vote in Previous Elec.
0.258**
0.255**
0.250***
(0.102)
(0.104)
(0.091)
Challenged in Primary?
-5.696***
-5.775***
-4.901***
(1.452)
(1.508)
(1.346)
Senators are in Same Party
0.502
0.777
-0.778
(1.776)
(1.818)
(1.633)
Cash on Hand
0.691**
0.686**
0.288
(millions of $)
(0.299)
(0.308)
(0.240)
House of Representatives
0.560
0.455
-0.174
(1.473)
(1.571)
(1.366)
Female
-2.292
-1.826
-2.006
(1.983)
(2.107)
(1.777)
Pork Election Year
-0.005
(millions of $)
(0.008)
Pork Year Before Election
0.005
(millions of $)
(0.008)
Pork Two Yr Before Election
-0.004
(millions of $)
(0.008)
Constant
49.346
49.68
21.175
(5.911)
(6.041)
(5.477)
Observations
117
117
117
R-squared
0.507
0.451
0.577
F-statistic
10.88***
8.34***
16.18***

(4)
0.344***
(0.045)

1.487
(1.397)
-0.117
(0.500)
0.237**
(0.091)
-4.713***
(1.368)
-0.266
(1.646)
0.298
(0.249)
-0.742
(1.440)
-1.292
(1.867)
-0.011
(0.007)
0.012*
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.008)
21.889
(5.680)
117
0.598
12.88***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) Results
Regressions 5 and 7 use a two-stage least squares approach. Both the first and second stage
results are given below. The first stage results, shown in table 21, are similar to the results from
the previous chapter. Without spending too much time on the first-stage results, the key
outcome is that pork-barrel spending in the election year is significant and positively correlated
with total fundraising and incumbent fundraising share. Because pork-barrel spending is
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correlated with fundraising but not with electoral performance, pork-barrel spending may be
used as an instrument. The other control variables also function in the same way that they did
in the previous chapter of this dissertation.
The second stage results, shown in table 22, continue to show the control variables
behaving in much the same way they did in the pooled OLS regressions. In addition, they
illustrate that there is a relationship between fundraising share and electoral performance even
though there is no direct relationship between total fundraising and electoral performance. The
lack of significance is likely due to the fact that both incumbent fundraising and challenger
fundraising are used to estimate the incumbent’s share of the vote. While they both are related
to electoral performance, they also likely are correlated with each other leading to bias in the
estimates. On the other hand, both incumbent and challenger fundraising are incorporated into
the incumbent’s share of fundraising. As mentioned earlier, Samuels (2002) and Stratmann
(2013) both use share of fundraising which is likely due to the advantages discussed earlier.
The results from regression 6 support the last two hypotheses of the paper. The first stage
illustrates that pork-barrel spending is positively correlated with fundraising. Then, the second
stage shows the positive correlation between share of fundraising and share of votes in the
general election. Also, recalling that I showed that pork-barrel spending is not correlated with
electoral success, I have effectively proven all three of the hypotheses I stated earlier in the
paper. Politicians are able to increase their share of the vote through the use of pork-barrel
spending, but not directly. Politicians can use pork-barrel spending to increase their fundraising
which can then be used to increase their chances of being re-elected.
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Table 21: 2SLS First Stage Results (Regressions 5-8)
Dependent Variable
Variable
Pork Election Year
(millions of $)
Pork Year Before Election
(millions of $)
Pork Two Yr Before Election
(millions of $)
Log(Population)
Total Challenger Fundraising
(millions of $)
Democrat
Number of Terms
% of Vote in Previous Elec.
Faced Challenger in Primary?
Senators are in Same Party
Cash on Hand
(millions of $)
House of Representatives
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
2012 Election
Constant
Observations
R-squared
F/Wald-statistic
Dependent Variable

Total Incumbent Fundraising
(5)
(6)
0.015**
0.023***
(0.006)
(0.006)
0.005
-0.002
(0.006)
(0.007)
-0.018***
-0.003
(0.007)
(0.013)
5.410***
(1.273)
0.740***
0.707***
(0.080)
(0.086)
0.014
-1.995
(0.904)
(1.546)
0.201
0.877**
(0.324)
(0.394)
-0.127**
-0.184**
(0.058)
(0.077)
0.605
1.087
(0.899)
(0.958)
0.360
0.795
(1.061)
(1.640)
0.813***
0.356
(0.157)
(0.269)
0.327
2.041*
(0.924)
(1.147)
2.238*
6.136**
(1.200)
(1.705)
0.700
0.458
(1.245)
(1.294)
1.750
2.349
(1.582)
(1.650)
1.434
1.444
(1.413)
(1.353)
4.917***
5.911***
(2.024)
(2.088)
8.139
9.383
(3.499)
(4.885)
117
117
0.711
0.705
14.34***
7.78***
Total Incumbent Fundraising

Share of Inc. Fundraising
(7)
(8)
0.026
0.026
(0.020)
(0.020)
-0.051**
-0.051
(0.021)
(0.021)
-0.012
-0.013
(0.021)
(0.021)

-1.851
-1.941
(3.123)
(3.162)
1.766
1.758
(1.096)
(1.103)
0.175
0.169
(0.200)
(0.202)
-3.769
-3.665
(3.128)
(3.125)
7.782**
7.772
(3.586)
(3.633)
1.997***
2.021
(0.517)
(0.527)
5.853*
5.880
(3.192)
(3.209)
0.839
1.030
(4.155)
(4.201)
-6.108
-6.132
(4.285)
(4.264)
-8.366
-8.436
(5.457)
(5.443)
-2.662
-2.844
(4.855)
(4.820)
-6.288
-6.500
(6.981)
(6.963)
65.219
65.742
(11.748)
(11.839)
117
117
0.342
3.50***
51***
Share of Total Fundraising

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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Table 22: 2SLS Second Stage Results (Regressions 5-8)
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Vote Incumbent Received in Senate General Election
Variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
Incumbent Fundraising Share
0.249**
(as % of total fundraising)
(0.131)
Total Incumbent Fundraising
-0.135
0.179
(millions of $)
(0.293)
(0.484)
Total Challenger Fundraising
-0.653**
-0.923**
(millions of $)
(0.279)
(0.409)
Democrat
1.994
-0.179
1.510
(1.448)
(3.016)
(1.389)
Number of Terms
-0.067
0.417
-0.093
(0.501)
(0.861)
(0.491)
% of Vote in Previous Elec.
0.249**
0.019
0.273***
(0.105)
(0.178)
(0.095)
Faced Challenger in Primary?
-5.651***
-5.189***
-5.329***
(1.399)
(2.022)
(1.456)
Senators are in Same Party
0.610
1.980
-0.115
(1.764)
(3.530)
(1.870)
Cash on Hand
0.749*
0.942
0.441
(millions of $)
(0.395)
(0.598)
(0.327)
House of Representatives
0.560
0.444
0.145
(1.403)
(2.217)
(1.411)
Female
-2.124
-3.782
-2.095
(2.046)
(4.365)
(1.733)
Constant
50.042
60.527
25.710
(6.503)
(10.436)
(8.592)
Observations
117
117
117
R-squared
0.506
0.421
0.562
Wald-statistic
119.89***
7,088***
95.60***

(4)
0.255*
(0.137)

1.430
(1.467)
-0.083
(0.518)
0.263***
(0.099)
-5.301***
(1.513)
-0.121
(1.971)
0.443
(0.347)
0.107
(1.478)
-2.172
(1.834)
25.906
(9.016)
117
0.483
85.29***

Standard errors in parentheses: *** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Panel TSLS Results
Next, I repeat the previous set of two-stage regressions in a panel setting. Regression 6
is the panel treatment of regression 5 while regression 8 is the panel treatment of regression 7.
The first stage results are displayed in table 3 while the second stage results are displayed in
table 4. The Hausman Test indicates that fixed-effects should be used when the dependent
variable is total incumbent fundraising and that random-effects should be used when the
dependent variable is the incumbent’s share of total fundraising. The Hausman Test results are
given in table 23.
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Table 23: Hausman Test Results
Dependent Variable
Total Incumbent Fundraising
Incumbent Share of Fundraising
H0: A random effects model should be used.
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

Chi-Squared Statistic
31.21***
8.15

In general, the results are very similar to the pooled 2SLS estimates. This demonstrates that
the estimates are robust to changes in the estimation approach. Just as before, the share of
incumbent fundraising is both significant and positively correlated with electoral success while
total fundraising is not. In addition, challenger fundraising and a primary election challenger are
both negatively correlated with general election performance while previous election
performance is positively correlated with the incumbent’s share of votes.

3SLS Regression Results
Finally, I repeat the estimation using a simultaneous equations framework. The results are
given below in tables 24 and 25. The first table gives the results for the vote share regressions
while the second table gives the results for the fundraising regressions.
The results for the set of regressions which use total incumbent fundraising are essentially
identical under both the 2SLS and 3SLS frameworks. Therefore, I will not discuss them at any
more length. The results for the set of regressions which use the share of fundraising do differ
to some degree, but only within the fundraising regression. Pork-barrel spending, specifically
during the election year, is shown to be significant and positively correlated with the
incumbent’s share of fundraising and the incumbent’s share of fundraising is shown to be
significant and positively correlated with the incumbent’s share of the votes in the general
election. This once again reaffirms the main thesis of this paper that pork-barrel spending does
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increase the likelihood of being re-elected, but indirectly. If pork-barrel spending is properly
timed and funneled to concentrated groups, the legislator responsible for the federal money
can be rewarded with additional campaign contributions. The additional contributions allow the
incumbent to increase their campaign reach which in turn increases the percentage of the votes
they receive in the general election.
Table 24: 3SLS First Stage Results (% of Vote in General Election)
Equation 1 Dependent Variable: Incumbent’s Share of Votes
Variable
(9)
(10)
Incumbent Fundraising Share
0.250**
(as % of total fundraising)
(0.131)
Total Incumbent Fundraising
-0.135
(millions of $)
(0.293)
Total Challenger Fundraising
-0.653**
(millions of $)
(0.279)
Democrat
1.992
1.657
(1.447)
(1.365)
Number of Terms
-0.067
-0.107
(0.501)
(0.491)
% of Vote in Previous Elec.
0.249**
0.275***
(0.105)
(0.095)
Faced Challenger in Primary?
-5.652***
-5.314***
(1.399)
(1.456)
Senators are in Same Party
0.610
-0.111
(1.764)
(1.870)
Cash on Hand
0.749*
0.438
(millions of $)
(0.395)
(0.327)
House of Representatives
0.560
0.135
(1.403)
(1.411)
Female
-2.123
-2.143
(2.046)
(1.731)
Constant
50.044
25.532
(6.503)
(8.586)
R-Squared
0.506
0.562
Chi-Squared Value
119.89***
95.81***

Standard errors in parentheses:
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level
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Table 25: 3SLS Equation 2 Result (Fundraising)
Equation 2 Results
Variable
Pork Election Year
(millions of $)
Pork Year Before Election
(millions of $)
Pork Two Yr Before Election
(millions of $)
Log(Population)
Total Challenger Fundraising
(millions of $)
Number of Terms
% of Vote in Previous Elec.
Faced Challenger in Primary?
Senators are in Same Party
Cash on Hand
(millions of $)
House of Representatives
Female
2006 Election
2008 Election
2010 Election
2012 Election
Constant
R-Squared
Chi-Squared
Observations

Total Incumbent
Fundraising
(11)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.018***
(0.006)
5.396***
(1.170)
0.740***
(0.073)
0.199
(0.286)
-0.127**
(0.053)
0.597
(0.824)
0.355
(0.976)
0.814***
(0.144)
0.329
(0.849)
2.241**
(1.070)
0.698
(1.142)
1.812
(1.454)
1.433
(1.294)
4.878***
(1.845)
8.109
(3.154)
0.711
288.19***
117

Share of
Fundraising
(12)
0.028*
(0.019)
-0.054***
(0.019)
-0.009
(0.019)

1.510
(0.981)
0.204
(0.184)
-3.917
(2.895)
7.726**
(3.329)
1.957***
(0.479)
5.764**
(2.960)
-0.040
(3.746)
-5.909
(3.922)
-7.322
(5.002)
-1.814
(4.426)
-7.028
(6.311)
62.507
(10.636)
0.338
60.50***

Standard errors in parentheses:
*** =1%, **=5%, *=10% significance level

4.5 Conclusion
Overall, three related hypotheses based on Samuels (2002) are tested in this paper. First,
pork-barrel spending does not directly help incumbents win elections. This was demonstrated
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when pork-barrel spending was shown to be statistically unrelated to an incumbent’s vote
share. Second, pork-barrel spending increases an incumbent’s ability to fundraise. This was
verified both in the previous chapter of the dissertation as well as the first stage of the twostage regressions. Specifically, pork-barrel money appropriated in the election year is shown to
be positively correlated with incumbent fundraising. Third, campaign funds help incumbents
win reelection. This is verified in the second stage of the regressions in addition to an array of
previous literature.
Once the three hypotheses are combined, a clearer picture presents itself. Incumbents are
able to increase their chances of winning re-election by using pork-barrel spending but not
directly. Instead, they can use pork-barrel spending to increase their ability to fundraise. That
additional money can then be used to increase their chances of being reelected. This additional
link is likely why researchers have had difficulty in connecting pork-barrel spending to electoral
success even if the connection seems logical. This result is analogous with the results from the
Brazilian political system as demonstrated by David Samuels (2002.)
In the previous chapter I found that a ten million dollar increase in pork-barrel spending
leads to a 0.36% increase in the share of fundraising. In this paper, I find that a 1% increase in
fundraising share leads to approximately a 0.25% increase in vote share. Therefore, the $10
million increase in pork-barrel spending will lead to a 0.10% increase in the share of the vote in
an election. In close elections, this could very easily be the difference between winning and
losing an election. Also, considering that the average pork-barrel spending per state in an
election year was $104 million, incumbents can increase their chances of re-election by 1.04%.
From 2004 to 2012 there have been a total of nine Senate races decided by less than 1.04%.
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This is not to say that even one of those races was decided because of pork-barrel spending;
instead, this is evidence that there are multiple races that are within the margin that could be
created if a legislator uses pork-barrel spending properly.
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Chapter 5: Pork-Barrel Spending and the Tragedy of the Commons
Abstract
This chapter concludes the dissertation by qualitatively considering pork-barrel
spending as a common resource. Further, I summarize the results from the earlier
chapters of this dissertation.

5.1 Pork-Barrel Spending as a Common Resource
A common resource is a commodity which is non-excludable but is rival. While no person
can be excluded from using the good, increased consumption of the good results in less of that
good being available for others. Common resources suffer from the Tragedy of the Commons
which is the tendency for common resources to be overused and eventually depleted. Some
traditional examples of the Tragedy of the Commons are the overhunting of the buffalo in
America during the 1800’s, overfishing in public waters, and the deforestation of the rain forest.
Earmark or pork-barrel spending is said to suffer from the same problem, referred to as the
Fiscal Commons problem. Based on the work in this dissertation, it seems as though pork-barrel
spending does in fact suffer from this problem.
In order to conceptualize this issue from a political framework, I use a generalized 2-player
payout structure. Using a two-region framework, suppose that legislators from Region A and
Region B both must make the decision whether or not to accept pork-barrel money. Further,
suppose that a district receives a +4 if the legislator accepts the money but a -6 if the legislator
from the other district accepts money. The payouts are as follows:
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Reg. B

Reg. A

(Reg. A Payout, Reg. B Payout)

Earmark Spending

Refuse Earmark Spending

Earmark Spending

(-2,-2)

(4,-6)

Refuse Earmark Spending

(-6,4)

(0,0)

Figure 5: Game Theory Setup of Fiscal Commons Problem
The dominant strategy in this game setup is for both regions to engage in earmark
spending. While this strategy does not maximize welfare, it does guarantee that the district
avoids the situation in which they pay for other’s projects yet receive no benefits at all.
Intuitively, this would be the situation where a legislator passes on receiving extra funding for
her district while a neighboring district receives the additional earmark money. The important
thing to remember is that every district pays for the project regardless of whether or not they
actually accept any funding. This creates the incentive for a politician to accept earmark funding
regardless of the total impact on social welfare. In reality, there are two distinct problems with
the previous simplistic setup. First, the game assumes that earmark spending is socially
inefficient. Even though public opinion supports this idea, there is no concrete evidence to
prove it. Secondly, total social welfare is difficult to measure. Therefore, I must be cautious
when using my results to make any determination of a fiscal commons problem.

5.2 Literature Pertaining to the Fiscal Commons Problem
There is a growing amount of literature pertaining to the fiscal commons problem. While it
has been long-recognized that common resources experience the Tragedy of the Commons,
more recent research has focused on this problem in the public sector. It has even been noted
that public policy meant to avoid the common resource problem exacerbates the problem the
policy was designed to prevent (Ostrom, Walker et al. 1992). In general, consumers demand
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much more of a good if someone else is paying. This allows politicians to make decisions in
much greater haste and without regard to budgetary sustainability (Caplan 2007). In addition,
the political process is even more susceptible to the common resource problem as politicians
not only have the ability to redistribute wealth between income groups and geographic areas,
but they also have the ability to transfer wealth from the future to the present through the use
of debt-financing (Buchanan 1958).
Ostrom, along with others, formalize the methodology required for properly managing
common resources in a way to avoid the common resource problem (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom,
Walker et al. 1992; Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994; Ostrom and Walker 1997; Ostrom 1998; Jakee
and Turner 2002). Firstly, there must be a broad consensus on sustainable levels of overall use.
Secondly, there must be some generally agreed upon principle pertaining to who has access to
the common good and in which capacity. Thirdly, there must be an efficient monitoring system
to ensure the levels of access mentioned in the previous condition are being met. Finally, there
must be effective and practical penalties imposed on those that violate the agreement (Ostrom
1990).
Jakkee and Turner boil the common resource problem down to two main causes. First of all,
an institution must be able to limit the free-rider problem. At the heart of the common
resource problem is the free-rider problem. Because rational individuals pursue their own selfinterests, they have an incentive to receive a good for free regardless of the impact on total
social welfare. Secondly, an effective institution works to reduce the information problem.
Traditionally, the information problem is the inability to fully coordinate activity causing
asymmetric information between economic players. One common solution is to centralize
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information and decision-making, but this centralization is believed to create larger problems as
the power of spontaneous order is harnessed (Hayek 1937). Further, it is not feasible for each
individual to fully recognize all available options which are made available to them (Simon
1982; Simon 1984). This problem, known as bounded rationality, also implies that individuals
are not fully aware of the decisions being made around them. Again, one possible solution to
this is centralized knowledge, but this is typically expensive, time-consuming and inefficient.
Not only does the asymmetric information create inefficient decision-making, but, as
mentioned, it typically spawns more social institutions which are meant to combat the problem
(Hayek 1973; Heiner 1983; Vanberg 1994; Ostrom 1998; Jakee and Turner 2002).
Earmark legislation suffers a similar fate. When comparing earmark legislation to the
sustainability guidelines set forth by Ostrom, half of the criteria are met. For instance, the first
criterion is that there must be a broad consensus on appropriate usage of the resource, which
in this case is pork-barrel spending. In a previous literature review, one conclusion was that the
optimal amount of earmark spending was zero, yet money is spent nonetheless (Primo and
Snyder 2010). Therefore, the first criterion is met as there is a general consensus that
distributive spending should be zero. The third criterion, pertaining to monitoring, is also met
due to recent legislation requiring legislators to attach their name to any pork-barrel money
they obtain. On the other hand, the second criteria, dealing with the access to the common
good, should not matter as no one should have access. But, this is clearly not the case as
earmark spending is far from zero. Further, there is no punishment mechanism for those who
actually engage in earmark legislation. In fact, if my research is correct indicating obtaining
earmark spending does increase the likelihood of being re-elected, not engaging in pork-barrel
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spending can actually act as a punishment. Thus, it is clear that the goals of the legislator and
the goals of the constituents in a district are different.

5.3 Primary Findings
In chapter 2, I focus on the impact that pork-barrel spending has on job creation. Ultimately,
I find that pork-barrel spending does create some short-term job creation but many of those
jobs disappear after only one year. I also find, using a spatial analysis, that pork-barrel spending
in one state can shift employment out of surrounding states. Thus, one state’s increase in porkbarrel spending can have a negative impact on neighboring states. This both fits into the
theoretical game theory setup described earlier as well as the definition of the fiscal commons
problem. Therefore, chapter 2 does provide evidence of a fiscal commons problem.
Chapter 3 examines the impact pork-barrel spending has on fundraising. I find that porkbarrel spending does have a positive and significant impact on an incumbent’s ability to
fundraise. Therefore, incumbents do have the incentive to appropriate pork-barrel money into
their state for their own purposes. This can be done by funneling money to special interests
who, in turn, contribute to an incumbent’s campaign. While this does not necessarily prove that
this is the incumbent’s aim when appropriating the funds, the incentive nonetheless exists.
Finally, chapter 4 uses the work from chapter 3 and uses a two-stage approach. In this
chapter, I find that fundraising does have a positive impact on re-electability and that porkbarrel spending has a positive impact on fundraising. Therefore, while pork-barrel spending
does not have a direct impact on a Senator’s re-election chances, pork-barrel spending does
have an indirect impact and can assist the Senate in his or her re-election bid. Again, this paper
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does not prove that this type of action actually does exist, only that Senators have the ability
and incentive to engage in this type of action.
Ultimately, there is evidence that pork-barrel spending does indeed create a fiscal commons
problem. Between the negative impact the spending has on other states and the incentive
Senators have to use the funding for their own benefit, the opportunity for abuse exists. While
more work would need done to prove that Senators are actually engaging in this abuse,
anecdotal evidence would seem to support that this type of activity does occur.
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